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THE FORUM OF CONSCIENCE: APPLYING 
STANDARDS UNDER THE FREE 
EXERCISE CLAUSE 
PAUL MARcus* 
The 1973 Supreme Court decision in Wisconsin v. Yoder reenforced and amplified 
the Court's earlier holding in Sherbert v. Verner that the free exercise clause of the first 
amendment requires the state to render substantial deference to religiously motivated 
behavior in the application of its laws and regulatory schemes. In this article, Mr. 
Marcus traces the evolving standards of free exercise doctrine and observes that the 
"balancing test'' which has resulted from that evolution requires still further refinement 
to give religious freedom its full constitutional due. The author then illustrates how the 
new standards of free exercise might be applied in a variety of situations in which free 
exercise claims are most commonly asserted. 
[I]n the forum of conscience, duty to a moral power higher than the 
State has always been maintained. 
Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes1 
When the state through its laws seeks to override reasonable moral 
commitments it makes a dangerously uncharacteristic choice. The 
law grows from the deposits of morality. Law and morality are, in 
turn, debtors and creditors of each other. The law cannot be ade-
quately enforced by the courts alone, or by courts supported merely 
by the police and the military. The true secret of legal might lies in 
the habits of conscientious men disciplining themselves to obey the law 
they respect without the necessity of judicial and administrative orders. 
When the law treats a reasonable, conscientious act as a crime it sub-
verts its own power. It invites civil disobedience. It impairs the very 
habits which nourish and preserve the law. 
Chief Judge Charles Wyzanski2 
Throughout the American experience, the right to believe in and 
worship one's own concept of .the Supreme Deity has been said by 
judges and legislators alike to be a cherished and fundamental right 
* A.B. 1968, J.D. 1971, University of California at Los Angeles; Assistant Pro· 
fessor of Law, University of lllinois, effective fall, 1974. The author is indebted to 
the following persons for their valuable assistance m reviewing and commenting upon 
drafts of this Article: his wife Rebecca, Melville B. Nimmer, and Lionel S. Sobel. 
1. United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 633 (1931) (Hughes, C.J., dis· 
senting), overruled by Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946). 
2. United States v. Sisson, 297 F. Supp. 902, 910-11 (D. Mass. 1969) (Wyzan· 
ski, J.), appeal dismissed, 399 U.S. 267 (1970). 
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at the very heart of an individual's freedom. 8 This right to exercise 
one's religion is protected under the free exercise clause of the first 
amendmenf4 and, along with the rights of free speech and press, oc-
cupies a "preferred position" in the constitutional hierarchy of pro-
tected rights. 5 While the free exercise clause was held, relatively early, 
to apply to the states as well as to the federal government, 6 individuals 
asserting free exercise claims have generally been successful in neither 
state nor federal courts. 
In passing on these claims, the courts have indicated a sharp 
theoretical awareness of the fundamental nature of free exercise rights 
and, through much of this century, have said that a substantial free 
exercise claim would only be denied if the state could demonstrate that 
it had a compelling purpose for its statute. 7 Nevertheless, until very 
recently the courts consistently found such compelling purposes, no 
matter how strong the free exercise argument. 8 
The free exercise "losers" have been Mormons who served stiff 
sentences for practicing polygamy,9 and independently lost the right 
3. "One's right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom 
of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may· not be submitted to vote; 
they depend on the outcome of no elections." West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v, 
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943). 
4. The first amendment provides in part that: "Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . • •• " 
5. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943); Barnett v. Rodgers, 410 F.2d 
995 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Sharp v. Sigler, 408 F.2d 966 (8th Cir. 1969). The concept had 
its origin in Chief Justice Stone's famous footnote 4 in United States v. Carotene 
Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938). But see Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles 
of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L. REV. 1, 25 (1959) (footnotes omitted): 
[l]t never has been really clear what is asserted or denied to have a prefer-
ence and over what. Certainly the concept is pernicious if it implies that 
there is any simple, almost mechanistic basis for determining priorities of 
values having constitutional dimension, as when there is an inescapable con-
flict between claims to free press and a fair trial. It has a virtue, on the 
other hand, insofar as it recognizes that some ordering of social values is 
essential; that all cannot be given equal weight, if the Bill of Rights is to be 
maintained. 
6. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). 
7. See generally Galanter, Religious Freedom in the United States: A Turning 
Point?, 1966 Wis. L. REv. 217, 236 & n.117. 
8. Note, Compulsory Medical Treatment: The State's Interest Reevaluated, 51 
MINN. L. REv. 293, 295 (1966). 
9. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). See also Cleveland v. United 
States, 329 U.S. 14 (1946); In reState in Interest of Black, 3 Utah 2d 315, 283 P.2d 
887, cert. denied, 350 U.S. 923 (1955). Although the polygamy issue in the free exer-
cise context has been largely mooted by the Mormon faith's subsequent renunciation and 
prohibition of the practice, the precedents in this area are instructive-if for no other 
reason than their almost total failure to weigh the sincerity and importance of the out-
lawed religious practice against whatever deleterious effects condoning that practice in 
the case of the Mormons may have had.on the community at large. For a more ex-
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to vote;10 conscientious objectors who could not attend state-run uni-
versities, 11 and could not, for a period, become naturalized citizens of 
the United States;12 Jehovah's Witnesses who, for a time, could be re-
quired to pay flat license fees to sell their religious texts, 13 and still pre-
sumably can be prohibited from having their children sell or distribute 
religious literature in public;14 and Black Muslims, who have had an 
uphill battle in asserting the right to discuss and practice their religion 
while in prison.15 
These groups, as well as groups with more unusual views, 16 
have historically failed miserably in their free exercise arguments. As 
recently as 1957 a commentator reviewing the case law could, with 
reasonable accuracy, make the following statement: 
[G]enerally when Congress or a state legislature, in the exercise of some 
constitutional power, enacts a statute which requires or prohibits some 
action, and makes the violation a criminal offense, there is no require-
ment inherent in the First Amendment that religious beliefs shall con-
stitute a sufficient excuse or justification for noncompliance with the 
terms of the statute.17 
In short, Professor Kurland was probably correct when he stated 
that, while the courts had generally been tolerant toward religious mi-
norities, "the caveat must be added that the minority must not be too 
small or too eccentric."18 
Relief in the free exercise area, when granted, tended to be based 
on alternative constitutional provisions. Indeed, even in his famous 
religious freedom-flag salute opinion, Justice Jackson made it fairly clear 
tensive discussion of the current balancing approach in the free exercise area, see text 
accompanying notes 136-50 infra. 
10. Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890). 
11. Hamilton v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S. 245 (1934). 
12. United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931), overruled by Girouard v. 
United States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946). 
13. Jones v. City of Opelika, 316 U.S. 584 (1942), vacated & rev'd per curiam on 
rehearing, 319 U.S. 103 (1943). 
14. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944). 
15. Childs v. Pegelow, 321 F.2d 487 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 932 
(1964); In re Ferguson, 55 Cal. 2d 663, 674, 361 P.2d 417, 423, 12 Cal. Rptr. 753, 
759, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 864 (1961) (''the Muslim Religious Group is not entitled as of 
right to be allowed to practice their religious beliefs in prison. • . .") See text 
accompanying notes 182-96 infra. 
16. See, e.g., United States v. Ku.ch, 288 F. Supp. 439 (D.D.C. 1968). See text 
accompanying note 165 infra. · 
17. M. KoNVITZ, FuNDAMENTAL LmERTIES oF A FREE PEOPLE: RELIGION, SPEECH, 
PRESs, AssEMBLY 46 (1957). 
18. Kurland, Expanding Concepts of Religious Freedom, Foreword--Church and 
State in the United States: A New Era of Bad Feelings, 1966 Wis. L. REv. 215, 216. 
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that his primary ground of decision was the free speech clause rather 
than the free exercise clause.19 
It would be safe, therefore, to say that most courts, and certainly 
the Supreme Court, had not expressly resolved a major free exercise 
claim in favor of the individual and against the state prior to 1963. 
Yet, in the short ten-year period since Sherbert v. Verner20 the law of 
free exercise rights has changed remarkably, culminating in Wisconsin 
v. Yoder. 21 In light of these dramatic changes, and the failure of 
many courts to properly recognize them, the time is ripe for a recon-
sideration of the application of standards under the free exercise clause. 
Given this new judicial flexibility concerning free exercise arguments, 
workable standards must be enunciated to ensure whatever predict-
ability and consistency is possible in this necessarily subjective area. 
It is the purpose of this Article to analyze those standards which have 
been adopted by the Supreme Court and to demonstrate how they 
should be applied in those situations, old and new, where free exer-
cise claims are so important. The first step in this analysis is to look 
briefly at Yoder, Sherbert, and their important predecessor, Braunfeld 
v. Brown, 22 to see just how far we have come since 1961. 
THE CHERISHED POSITION 
Braunfeld v. Brown 
Of the four Sunday closing cases decided in 1961, only in Braun-
feld v. Brown,23 was the "pure" free exercise argument made.24 The 
Sunday-closing cases involved the prosecution of Orthodox Jews tmder 
state laws which prohibited engaging in retail sales on Sundays. 
Braunfeld's attorney argued that if Braunfeld were forced to close on 
Sunday it "[would] result in impairing [his] ability ... to earn a 
livelihood and [would] render [him] unable to continue in his busi-
19. "If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no 
official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, 
religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their 
faith therein." West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 
(1943). 
20. 374 u.s. 398 (1963). 
21. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). For a discussion of Sherbert and Yoder see text ac-
companying notes 39-74 infra. 
22. 366 u.s. 599 (1961). 
23. Id. 
24. The other three cases were Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Supermarket, 366 U.S. 
617 (1961); M:cGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Two Guys from Harrison-
Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961). In these cases, establishment 
clause contentions were primarily argued before the Court. 
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ness," thereby causing him to lose his capital investment, solely because 
Braunfeld was a Sabbatarian. 25 Simply stated, Braunfeld's position 
was that to compel him to choose between going out of business and 
giving up his Sabbath religious practices constituted an undue infringe-
ment of his free exercise rights. 
Mr. Chief Justice Warren, joined by Justices Black, Clark and 
Whittaker, rejected this argument, finding that the burden on the 
plaintiff pursuing his religious views, while arguably severe, was never-
theless indirect. 26 Even though the statute would be invalid if "the 
State may accomplish its purpose by means which do not impose such 
a burden,"27 ·the Chief Justice could find no such alternative means 
present. The state's interest was found to be a legitimate one, setting 
"one day of the week apart from the others as a day of rest, repose, 
recreation, and ·tranquility . . . . "28 Thus, alternative means such as 
exempting religious individuals from the statute "might well under-
mine the State's goal of providing a day that, as best possible, elimi-
nates the atmosphere of commercial noise and aotivity."29 The Chief 
Justice was also concerned with other possible free exercise problems 
if such exemptions were granted to Sabbatarians: 
To allow only people who rest on a day other than Sunday to keep 
their businesses open on that day might well provide these people with 
an economic advantage over their competitors who must remain closed 
on that day; this might cause the Sunday-observers to complain that 
their religions are being discriminated against. 30 
Additionally, such exemptions would require the state to make an in-
quiry into the sincerity of each individual's religious beliefs, "a prac-
tice which a State might believe would itself run afoul of the spirit of 
constitutionally protected religious guarantees. "31 
Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Stewart dissented. The principal 
free exercise dissent was written by Justice Brennan, who adopted the 
same basic test that had been utilized by the Chief Justice but reached 
a very different result.32 Though Justice Brennan stressed that he 
25. 366 U.S. at 601. 
26. Id. at 606. Justices Frankfurter and Harlan concurred in the result, in an 
opinion written by Justice Frankfurter. Id. at 610. 
27. 366 u.s. 599, 607. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. at 608. 
30. Id. at 608-09. 
31. Id. at 609. 
32. Justice Brennan queried: 
What overbalancing need is so weighty in the constitutional scale that it justifies this substantial, though indirect, limitation of appellants' freedom? 
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would require the state's interest to be a compelling one even if the bur~ 
den on the individual was indirect, 33 his chief departure concerned 
the question of whether the state might have accomplished its purposes 
by means which did not impose such an onerous, albeit indirect, burden 
on the plaintiff. 34 
Justice Brennan argued that requiring the state to grant an exemp~ 
tion to Orthodox Jews like Braunfeld would be appropriate, as 21 of 
the 34 states which had Sunday-closing regulations had such exemp~ 
tions, without having defeated the purpose of their statutes. While 
such exemptions ''would make Sundays a little noiser, and the task of 
police and prosecutor a little more difficult,"3G other problems were 
"more fanciful than real."36 He gave little attention to the claim that 
Sabbatarians would be receiving an unfair advantage over other mer~ 
chants and concluded by pointing out that inquiries into the good faith 
of the plaintiffs would be perfectly constitutional, as the Court itself had 
held in United States v. Ballard.37 
Justice Stewart, agreeing substantially with all that Brennan had 
written, stated the dissenting view succinctly but persuasively: 
Pennsylvania has passed a law which compels an Orthodox Jew to 
choose between his religious faith and his economic survival. That is 
a cruel choice. It is a choice which I think no State can constitution~ 
ally demand. For me this is not something that can be swept under 
the rug and forgotten in the interest of enforced Snnday togetherness. 
I think the impact of this law upon these appellants grossly violates 
their constitutional rights of the free exercise of their religion.3s 
Sherbert v. Verner 
Adell Sherbert was a member of the Seventh Day Adventist 
Church who had been fired because she would not work on Saturday, 
the Sabbath day of her faith. When she could not find other employ~ 
It is not the desire to stamp out a practice deeply abhorred by society, such 
as polygamy, as in Reynolds, for the custom of resting one day a week 
is universally honored, as the Court has amply shown. Nor is it the State's 
traditional protection of children • . . for appellants are reasoning and 
fully autonomous adults. It is not even the interest in seeing that everyone 
rests one day a week, for appellants' religion requires that they take such n 
rest. It is the mere convenience of having everyone rest on the same day. 
It is to defend this interest that the Court holds that a State need not follow 
the alternative route of granting an exemption for those who in good faith 
observe a day of rest other than Sunday. Id. at 614. 
33. Id. at 612. 
34. See id. at 614-15. 
35. Id. at 614. 
36. Id. at 615. 
37. 322 u.s. 78 (1944). 
38. 366 U.S. at 616. 
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ment which did not require Saturday work, she filed a claim for un-
employment compensation benefits. The state turned down her appli-
cation finding that she refused, without good cause, to accept "suitable 
work when offered . . . by the employment office or the employer 
• • • ."
39 Though careful not to overrule Braunfeld, 40 Justice Bren-
nan set a tone for the Sherbert opinion which differed drastically from 
that which had been set by the Chief Justice in Braunfeld. Recog-
nizing once again that the burden on the petitioner was merely in-
direct-i.e., the conduct of the petitioner was not outlawed, it was 
simply made more difficult-Justice Brennan began with a premise 
not recognized in Braunfeld. The Chief Justice in Braunfeld had 
stated that the initial inquiry in an indirect burden case is to determine 
if "the purpose and effect of [the State regulation] is to advance the 
State's secular goals."41 Justice Brennan made it quite clear that his 
threshold inquiry required a much stronger showing by the state: 
It is basic that no showing merely of a rational relationship to some 
colorable state interest would suffice; in this highly sensitive constitu-
tional area, "[o]nly the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests, 
give occ~ion for permissible limitation" .... 42 
Finding that "[n]o such abuse or danger has been advanced in 
the present case,"43 Justice Brennan never reached the question of 
whether there were alternative methods for promoting that state pur-
pose or interest. The only state interest that had been raised in Sher-
bert was a possibility that "the filing of fraudulent claims by unscrupu-
lous claimants feigning religious objections to Saturday work might 
not only dilute the unemployment compensation fund, but also hinder 
the scheduling by employers of necessary Saturday work."44 Justice 
Brennan brushed the contention aside, both on the ground that the 
argument had not been made to the South Carolina Supreme Court 
and because the record did not appear to sustain such a contention. 
The opinion further suggested, without deciding, that the "considera-
ation of such evidence [might be] foreclosed by the prohibition against 
judicial inquiry into the truth or falsity of religious beliefs."45 
Holding that no compelling state interest had been shown, Jus-
tice Brennan added that even if such an interest had been shown, the 
39. 374 U.S. at 401. 
40. See, e.g., id. at 403-04. 
41. 366 U.S. at 607. 
42. 374 U.S. at 406, citing Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945) (a public 
assembly case). 
43. 374 U.S. at 407. 
44. Id. 
45. ld. 
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state would still have to demonstrate that "no alternative forms of regula-
tion would combat such abuses without infringing First Amendment 
rights."46 Justice Brennan concluded his opinion by wholly dismissing 
the establishment clause argument against granting an exemption. He 
saw the exemption of Mrs. Sherbert from the usual unemployment com-
pensation rules as "nothing more than the governmental obligation of 
neutrality in the face of religious differences, [which] does not repre-
sent that involvement of religious with secular institutions which it is 
the object of the Establishment Clause to forestall."47 
Justices Douglas and Stewart filed separate concurrences, of which 
Justice Stewart's opinion is again more interesting. Justice Stewart 
agreed basically with Justice Brennan's free exercise notions, but 
thought that the exemption of Mrs. Sherbert might raise severe diffi-
culties under the Court's "insensitive [and] positively wooden" ap-
proach48 to the establishment clause. He proceeded to point out, 
however, that such difficulties would pose "no problem for me, because 
I think the Court's mechanistic concept of the Establishment Clause 
is historically unsound and constitutionally wrong."49 
The less dramatic, but more important aspect of Justice Stewart's 
concurrence was his view that the holding in Sherbert could not con-
sistently stand with Braunfeld. For one thing, Braunfeld involved a 
state criminal statute so "[t]he impact upon the appellant's religious 
freedom in the present case is considerably less onerous."50 While 
agreeing with Justice Brennan that the possibility of denying Mrs. Sher-
bert twenty-two weeks of compensation payments solely because she 
could not find suitable employment which did not require work on Sat-
urdays would be "enough to infringe upon the appellant's constitutional 
right to the free exercise of ller religion,"51 Justice Stewart felt that to 
justify such a conclusion "the Court must explicitly reject the reasoning 
of Braunfeld v. Brown."52 
Justice Harlan, joined in dissent by Justice White, agreed with 
Justice Stewart on the latter point. He found, first of all, that the sec-
ular purpose of the South Carolina statute was, if anything, clearer than 
46. Id. (footnote omitted). This was wholly in conflict with the tone of the 
Chief Justice's Braunfeld opinion, which almost presumed the nonexistence of al· 
temative forms that could combat those abuses. See, e.g., 366 U.S. at 608-09. 
47. Id. at 409. 
48. Id. at 414. 
49. Id. at 415. 
50. Id. at 417. 
51. Id. at 417-18. 
52. Id. at 418. 
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that involved in Braunfeld, and he too thought that the indirect bur-
den on Mrs. Sherbert was less than that on Mr. Braunfeld. "Clearly, any 
differences between this case and Braunfeld cut against the present ap-
pellant."o3 Justice Harlan could consistently reach that conclusion, 
for he saw South Carolina's unemployment compensation law as sim-
ply allowing compensation for those available for work; because Mrs. 
Sherbert was unavailable for work she was, therefore, ineligible for bene-
fits. "The fact that these personal considerations sprang from her reli-
gious convictions was wholly without relevance to the state court's ap-
plication of the law."54 
It seems clear now, ten years after the fact, that Justice Brennan 
was correct in both Braunfeld and Sherbert. Justice Harlan's conten-
tions notwithstanding, the plaintiffs in both cases were severely disad-
vantaged, solely because of their religious beliefs. Had there been 
some compelling interest for that disadvantage or burden-an interest 
which would have been defeated by exempting the particular peti-
tioners-then the states should have properly prevailed. In neither 
case, however, was such an interest present. In Braunfeld, even as-
suming that the state's interest in providing a uniform day of rest was 
compelling, there was no reason to defer to Pennsylvania's judgment 
that an exemption to that rule would have undermined the purpose of 
the statute, especially when two-thirds of the states which had the same 
laws had such exemptions. In Sherbert, the best argument that the 
state could muster concerned the potential for widespread fraudulent 
claims for religious exemptions, which might result once such relief 
was granted in particular situations. The Court made it clear, how-
ever, that this mere possibility was insufficient to override a free exer-
cise claim based on sincere religious conviction, especially when the 
state could not demonstrate the absence of alternative means to combat 
the potential fraud which would not impinge upon the exercise of reli-
gion. 
Wisconsin v. Yoder 
Old Order Amish communities believe "that salvation requires 
life in a church community separate and apart from the world and 
worldly influence."55 "The single most prominent aspect of Amish 
faith is the belief that separation from the world, i.e., from the worldli-
ness of contemporary society, is the sine qua non of spiritual salva-
53. Id. at 421. 
54. Id. at 420. 
55. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 210 (1972). 
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tion. "56 Formal public school education beyond the eighth grade is re-
jected by the Amish because it takes their children away from their 
community "during the crucial and formative adolescent period of 
life."57 As stated by Chief Justice Burger, 
Amish objection to formal education beyond the eighth grade is firmly 
grounded in these central religious concepts. They object to the high 
school and higher education generally because the values it teaches are 
in marked variance with Amish values and the Amish way of life; 
they view secondary school education as an impermissible exposure of 
their children to a "worldly'' influence in conflict with their beliefs . • • • 
Amish society emphasizes informal learning-through-doing, a life of 
"goodness," rather than a life of intellect, wisdom, rather than techni-
cal knowledge, community welfare rather than competition, and separa-
tion, rather than integration with contemporary worldly society. us 
Many Amish families have refused to send their children to school 
beyond the eighth grade and have risked criminal prosecution for viola-
tion of state compulsory school attendance statutes. uo In light of the 
expansive language in Sherbert and the fact that being required to at-
tend school against one's will appears to be far more of an infringement 
than being denied a relatively small sum of money, one would have 
thought that such a requirement would have been clearly unconstitutional 
after 1963.60 Yet prior to Yoder the risk taken by the Amish was 
a great one, as many courts subsequent to Sherbert wholly avoided 
56. Comment, The Amish and Compulsory School· Attendance: Recent Develop-
ments, 1911 Wis. L. REv. 832. 
51. 406 U.S. at 211. 
58. Id. at 210-11. See also Casad, Compulsory High School Attendance and the 
Old Order Amish: A Commentary on State v. Garber, 16 KAN. L. REv. 423 (1968). 
59. State v. Garber, 197 Kan. 567, 419 P.2d 896 (1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 51 
(1967); Commonwealth v. Beiler, 168 Pa. Super. 462, 479 A.2d 134 (1951). 
60. The Court made it clear that it did not intend Sherbert to be limited to the 
peculiar facts presented there, for soon after it decided Sherbert, the Court vacated the 
decision in In re Jenison, 265 Minn. 96, 120 N.W.2d 515 (1963 ), and remanded it for 
reconsideration in light of Sherbert, 315 U.S. 14 (1963). In Jenison, the defendant 
refused to serve on a jury for religious reasons. She was held in contempt on the 
ground that her refusal "offends the peace, safety, good order, or morals of the com-
munity." 265 Minn. at 99, 120 N.W.2d at 511. The Minnesota Supreme Court held 
that an exemption to this rule could only be created by the legislature, considering the 
importance of having a well functioning jury system. On reconsideration after the 
United States Supreme Court's action, the Minnesota Supreme Court took a different 
look at the situation. In re Jenison, 267 Minn. 136, 125 N.W.2d 588 (1963). The 
court held that an individual claiming an exemption from required jury duty for reli-
gious reasons would be exempt "until and unless further experience indicates that the 
indiscriminate invoking of the First Amendment poses a serious threat to the effective 
functioning of our jury system ••.• " 267 Minn. at 137, 125 N.W.2d at 589. 
Because no such indication existed, the conviction was reversed. See also State v. 
Everly, 150 W.Va. 423, 146 S.E.2d 705 (1966) (refusal to serve on grand jury). 
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or narrowly construed its holding in situations involving the Amish. For 
example, in Kansas v. Garber61 an Amish farmer refused to send his 
fifteen-year old daughter to public school. He was found guilty of violat-
ing the state's compulsory education statute and his conviction was 
affirmed on appeal. While conceding the sincerity of the defendant's 
objections to exposing his daughter to secular high school education, 
the Kansas Supreme Court insisted that compulsory school attendance 
would not abridge either his or his daughter's freedom "to worship and 
believe" as they chose. Stating that "[t]he question of how long a child 
should attend school is not a religious one," the court emphatically de-
nied an exemption on free exercise grounds. 62 
Garber, even prior to Yoder, had been severely critized as wholly 
ignoring the teachings of Sherbert in focusing on the kinds of bur-
dens that may be held to constitute infringements of one's rights under 
the free exercise clause. 63 Yet, as late as 1967 the Supreme Court re-
fused to review the holding in Garber. 64 
Five years later, the Supreme Court considered these free exer-
cise claims in a light wholly different from that in which the Kansas 
Supreme Court had considered them. Chief Justice Burger, for a six-
justice majority, began his Yoder opinion by finding that the Amish 
object to secular education beyond the first eight grades because of 
deeply held religious beliefs and that requiring these parents to send 
their children to school beyond the first eight grades would severely 
interfere with the parent's freedom to act pursuant to such beliefs. 
In striking down the compulsory attendance statute as applied to 
the Amish, the Court could not find any particular state interest "of 
sufficient magnitude to override the interest claiming protection under 
the Free Exercise Clause."65 A number of arguments were put forth 
by the state in support of its statute, but .the Court, in rejecting each 
one, was careful to point out that the alleged overriding interest of the 
state must be carefully and sensitively examined. 
Where fundamental claims of religious freedom are at stake, however, 
we cannot accept such a sweeping claim; despite its admitted validity 
in the generality of cases, we must searchingly examine the interests 
that the State seeks to promote by its requirement for compulsory 
61. 197 Kan. 567, 419 P.2d 896 (1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 51 (1967). 
62. 197 Kan. at 574, 419 P.2d at 902. See generally Galanter, supra note 7, at 
248. 
63. Casad, supra note 58. 
64. The Supreme Court denied a request for a grant of certiorari. 389 U.S. 51 
(1967). 
65. 406 U.S. at 214. 
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education to age 16, and the impediment to those objectives that would 
flow from recognizing the claimed Amish exemption. 66 
The Court recognized that the state has a substantial interest in 
providing some degree of education to prepare citizens to participate 
in society. The Chief Justice pointed out, however, that compulsory 
education beyond the eighth grade was not required to satisfy this in~ 
terest in the case of the Amish; hence the regulation, as to the Amish, 
violated the free exercise clause. That is, the Amish children suffi~ 
ciently acquired the educational fundamentals in the first eight grades, 
as could be seen by the fact the Amish were generally successful and 
lawful citizens. Moreover, the Amish themselves do provide educa~ 
tion for their children beyond the eighth grade by teaching them agri~ 
culture techniques and methods, giving them religious training, and 
generally educating them as to moral and ethical values. 
Justice White, with Justices Brennan and Stewart, concurred in 
the Chief Justice's opinion, but was careful to clarify the Court's pr~ 
cise holding. He noted that the state's interest in universal education 
might well be a sufficient justification for requiring all individuals, even 
the Amish, to attend school for a given number of years. He found, 
however, that "the State has [not] demonstrated that Amish children 
who leave school in the eighth grade will be intellectually stultified or un~ 
able to acquire new academic skills later."67 Such a determination 
was certainly heavily influenced by the very nature of the Amish as 
people who function in a successful but very segregated society. Thus 
the result was necessary "because the sincerity of the Amish religious 
policy here is uncontested, because the potentially adverse impact of 
the state requirement is great and because the State's valid interest 
in education has already been largely satisfied by the eight years the 
children have already spent in school."68 
Justice Stewart, joined by Justice Brennan, concurrred in the maj~ 
ority opinion, noting that the record did not present the curious and 
interesting question raised by Justice Douglas. Justice Douglas agreed 
with the Court that the free exercise rights of the parents had been in~ 
fringed. However, he disagreed "with the Court's conclusion that the 
matter is within the dispensation of the parents alone."60 That is, Jus~ 
tice Douglas argued, the children themselves had substantial free exer~ 
cise rights since they were the ones being forced to attend school. Be~ 
66. Id. at 221. 
67. I d. at 240. 
68. Id. at 241. 
69. Id. 
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cause only one of the children had affirmatively testified that her own 
religious views were the same as her parents on this matter, Douglas 
would have sent the case back to establish a record concerning the 
religious views of the other children. 70 
The answer to Justice Douglas' concern was hinted at by Justice 
Stewart in his reference to the fact that there was no indication in the 
record whatsover that the questions presented by Justice Douglas were 
involved in the particular case before the Court. No showing had been 
made by any party that the interests and views of the children were any-
thing but the same as those of the parents. Further, it is one thing for 
the Court to demand that the trial court question a child of fourteen 
or fifteen years concerning religious beliefs, and it is quite another to 
obtain intelligent, independent answers. In In re Green, 71 the state 
brought an action to have a guardian appointed on the basis that a four-
teen-year-old child had been neglected because his parent, a Jehovah's 
Witness, would not allow him to have a blood transfusion in connection 
with a spinal fusion operation. The court ultimately held that there 
was no showing that the child's life was in immediate danger, hence 
the state's interest had been outweighed by the free exercise interest of 
the parent. Nevertheless, the court remanded the case to determine if 
the child agreed with his parents' decision concerning the blood transfu-
sion. The dissenting judge, however, pointed out the dilemma which 
would then face the boy: 
We are herein dealing with a young boy who has been crippled most 
of his life, consequently, he has been under the direct control and 
guidance of his parents for that time. To now presume that he could 
make an independent decision as to what is best for his welfare and 
health is not reasonable. [Citation omitted]. Moreover, the mandate 
of the Court presents this youth with a most painful choice between the 
wishes of his parents and their religious convictions on the one hand, 
and his chance for a normal, healthy life on the other hand. We 
should not confront him with this dilemma. 72 
Absent some indication in the record that the children's views did 
in fact differ from that expressed by the parents, this writer would have 
to agree with the dissenting judge in Green that allowing a young 
child, any young child, to be heard concerning the broad sorts of ques-
tions raised in Yoder would be a painful task which ought to be avoided. 
Of course, if there is some such indication in the record, the issue may 
70. ld. at 246. 
71. 448 Pa. 338, 292 A.2d 367 (1972). 
72. 448 Pa. at , 292 A.2d at 395. 
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not be so easily put aside. This writer concludes that to allow the 
child's views to prevail over the parent's would be troublesome indeed. 
If the child is reasonably mature and articulate, however, then a good 
argument could be made that the free exercise of the parents' religion 
should not necessarily control the c4ild's life. Similarly, in the extreme 
situation in which a parent's religious predilections operate to fore-
close a child's opportunities for even a minimum level of intellectual 
and physical development, it would seem clear that the state itself 
could intervene to assert both society's interest in the healthy develop-
ment of its young and the child's own constitutional rights. But that 
issue raises questions beyond the scope of this Article. 
It has been argued in some quarters73 that Yoder, rather than 
striking a blow for individual religious liberties, extends broadened 
free exercise protection only to well-established churches. This ap-
proach to Yoder makes much of Chief Justice Burger's extensive dis-
cussion of the lengthy and consistent history of the Amish faith, and 
infers that a faith of more recent vintage may not have fared as well 
in the same circumstances. But Yoder need not be so narrowly con-
strued. The recitation of Amish tradition was set forth in the opinion not 
because the existence of such, a .tradition was viewed as the sine qua 
non for a religious exemption. Rather, the historical discussion was 
utilized in the case of the Amish to demonstrate "the sincerity of their 
religious beliefs, the interrelationship of belief with their mode of life 
... and the hazards presented by the State's enforcement of a sta-
tute generally valid as to others."74 It cannot convincingly be said that 
only a member of an established church will be able to demonstrate 
the factors of religious sincerity, actual practice, and incompatability 
with a given state regulation which the Court found so persuasive in 
Yoder. Viewed in this context, and read in conjunction with Sherbert, 
Yoder may be said to have substantially expanded the area in which 
free exercise claims may viably be asserted. 
FoRMULATING STANDARDS UNDER THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE 
It has never been seriously suggested that rights under the free 
exercise clause are any more absolute than rights under any other sec-
tion of the Constitution. Just as one may not yell "fire" in a crowded 
theater when there is no fire, one may not kill an unsuspecting person 
in order to make a religious sacrifice. As with cases arising under the 
73. Kurland, The Supreme Court, Compulsory Education, and the First Amend-
ments Religion Clauses, 15 W. VA. L. REv. 213, 237-38 (1973 ). 
74. 406 U.S. at 235. 
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free speech clause, the question here is one of determining when legiti-
mate claims of the state or society must prevail over constitutional rights 
conferred on the individual. 
There has been a remarkable number of simple cases in which 
free exercise claims have been raised where this question is not difficult 
at all, for it is clear in each such case that either the free exercise claim is 
nonsensical or that the state, on other grounds, must prevail: where 
a commercial performer argues that he is entitled to perform a copy-
righted musical composition in pursuit of his alleged religious rights;75 
where a taxpayer refuses to disclose recipients of his reported charitable 
deductions when those donations constituted over 20% of his annual 
gross income, on the ground that a disclosure would unduly interfere 
with the practice of his religion;76 where citizens move to block the 
public distribution of fluoridated water on alleged religious grounds, 
even though they are not compelled to purchase or use such water;77 
where an employee, on religious grounds, refuses treatment for injuries 
suffered in the scope of his employment, but still seeks compensation 
for injuries which were compounded or caused by the refusal of the 
treatment;78 or where individuals, acting out of sincere religious be-
liefs, attempt to physically disrupt the administrative workings of the 
government. 79 • 
15. Robert Stigwood Group Ltd. v. O'Reilly, 346 F. Supp. 376, 382-83 (D. Conn. 
1972). There the copyright on the rock opera "Jesus Christ, Superstar'' had been 
infringed, and the infringers claimed that because the substance of the rock opera had 
to do with religious beliefs the free exercise clause permitted the infringement. 
76. Hearde v. Commissioner, 421 F.2d 846 (9th Cir. 1970). 
77. Baer v. City of Bend, 206 Ore. 221, 292 P.2d 134 (1956); Kraus v. City of 
Cleveland, 55 Ohio Op. 6, 116 N.E.2d 779 (C.P. 1953), aff'd 163 Ohio St. 559, 
127 N.E.2d 609, cert. denied, 351 U.S. 935 (1956). 
78. Walter Nashert & Sons v. McCann, 460 P.2d 941 (Okla. 1969). See also 
Powers v. State Dep't of Social Welfare, 208 Kan. 605, 493 P.2d 590 (1972). In 
Powers, the plaintiff was denied disability benefits because she refused to submit to a 
medical examination. The court held that because it could not be properly deter-
mined if she was disabled without such a medical test, the state's interest in combatting 
fraudulent claims outweighed the individual's religious interest. The court's reliance 
on State v. Garber, 197 Kan. 567, 419 P.2d 896 (1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 51 
(1967), makes its holding suspect particularly because many of the plaintiff's disabilities 
could have been verified without a medical examination. Garber was one of the 
Amish compulsozy education cases decided after ·Sherbert which would appear to 
have been overruled by Yoder. See text accompanying notes 61-64 supra. But see 
Montgomezy v. Bd. of Retirement, 33 Cal. App. 3d 447, 109 Cal. Rptr. 181 (1973). 
79. United States v. Kroncke, 459 F.2d 697 (8th Cir. 1972). Of ~urse, there 
are a number of cases where it is just as clear that the State should not prevail. 
See, e.g., MacMillan v. Mazyland, 258 Md. 147, 265 A.2d 453 (1970) where the 
defendant was held in contempt for not removing his religious headgear in court. 
On appeal the contempt citation was dismissed, with the court noting that the re-
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It is not in such cases as these that the formulation of standards to 
resolve the conflict between .the state's interest and the individual religious 
interest is so crucial. Rather, it is the close cases, where reasonable men 
can and do differ, that bare all the competing interests and considera-
tions concerning the rights of individuals and the needs of society. 
These cases range from situations where persons are held in contempt 
for refusing to testify before a grand jury, 80 to the Amish farmer 
who refuses to send his child to school beyond the eighth grade, 81 to 
the orthodox Jew who may be forced out of his business as a result of 
a Sunday Oosing Law. 82 
With these tough cases one begins to hope, with Professor Wechs-
ler, that the courts' resolutions will be based upon standards or prin .. 
ciples which transcend the particular fact situation involved. 83 The 
Supreme Court has recently begun to formulate such standards, 84 al-
though there remains considerable room for refinement. Before focus-
ing on the application of these standards, it is important to consider 
briefly other standards used by the courts in deciding free exercise 
claims in order to note how inconsistent their disposition has been 
and to appreciate how truly dramatic is the Supreme Court's recent shift. 
Following the Founding Fathers? Wishes 
A few relatively early cases held that the courts could only deter-
mine the validity of a free exercise claim by looking to the historical 
setting of the enactment of the first amendment and deciding if the 
founding fathers would have wished that particular claim to be given 
free exercise protection. 85 While there has been a wealth of material 
written concerning the historical setting of the enactment of the free 
exercise clause, 86 there are severe and relatively obvious problems 
with such a standard. 
ligious headgear was worn for deeply held religious beliefs and that there was no com· 
pelling interest in requiring its removal. 
80. Smilow v. United States, 465 F.2d 802 (2d Cir. 1972), vacated, 409 U.S. 944 
(1973); People v. Woodruf, 26 A.D.2d 236, 272 N.Y.S.2d 786 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. 
1966). 
81. See text accompanying notes 55-74 supra. 
82. See text accompanying notes 23-38 supra. 
83. Wechsler, supra note 5. 
84. See text accompanying notes 23-74 supra. 
85. See, e.g., United States v. Hillyard, 52 F. Supp. 612 (E.D. Wash. 1943). 
86. See, e.g., Symposium-Constitutional Problems in Church-State Relations, 61 
Nw. U.L. REv. 761 (1966); Freeman, A Remonstrance for Conscience, 106 U. PA. 
L. REv. 806 (1958). For a discussion of the historical setting of the birth of the 
establishment clause, see C. A.NrlEAu, A. DoWNEY & E. RoBERTS, FREEDOM FROM 
FEDERAL EsTABLISHMENT (1964). 
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For one thing, the setting of the enactment of the first amend-
ment is quite inconclusive as to what the founding fathers had in mind 
with regard to freedom of religion problems. Moreover, even if a par-
ticular problem might have been contemplated at the time, it is no doubt 
true that different individuals would have resolved it in very different 
ways.87 
More importantly, it is quite likely that specific problems which 
now arise, almost 200 years after the enactment of the first amendment, 
could not even have been imagined by the founding fathers. Claims 
for unemployment compensation, or the claims of individuals who 
argue that they use drugs to practice their religion, are hardly eighteenth 
century difficulties. Yet, while the particular considerations of eight-
eenth century men are inconclusive and beyond reach, their purpose 
of preventing a tyranny by the majority and by the state is as clear and 
vital today as ever. 
Thus, without losing sight of the fundamental purpose underlying 
the free exercise clause, the courts have properly rejected a wooden 
analysis of history and instead have sought to develop standards appro· 
priate to twentieth century problems. To have done otherwise would 
have been to defeat a recognition of a vibrant first amendment. 
[As to the founding fathers' views] concerning religious freedom and 
nonestablishment, we must inevitably find them encrusted with cer-
tain implicit assumptions which were products of prevailing social, 
political, and economic conditions. Doctrinal formulations designed to 
achieve certain ends may achieve indifferent or perverse results as the 
assumptions on which they rest change. As the social, political, and 
economic milieu evolves, so must the content given the first amend-
ment.88 
The Action-Belief Distinction 
The distinction between conduct taken pursuant to religious be-
liefs, and religious beliefs themselves, reached its high point about 
thirty years ago. Some courts denied free exercise claims holding that 
even though the state could never interfere with one's religious beliefs, 
it could, if its regulation were rationally based, interfere with one's ac-
tions even if such actions were taken pursuant to the individual's reli-
87. Summers, The Sources and Limits of Religious Freedom, 41 ILL. L. REv. 53, 
56-57 (1946). 
88. Giannella, Religious Liberty, Establishment, and Doctrinal Development: Part 
1. The Religious Liberty Guarantee, 80 HAR.v. L. REv. 1381, 1383-84 (1967). See 
generally Clark, Guidelines for the Free Exercise Clause, 83 HAR.v. L. REv. 327 
(1969) 
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gious beliefs. 89 It was never clear from where the authority for such 
a distinction came. The Supreme Court never expressly based a hold-
ing on the distinction, though there is dicta which would seem to ap-
prove of it: "[The free exercise clause] safeguards the free exercise of 
the chosen form of religion. Thus the amendment embraces two con-
cepts,-freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute 
but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be."90 
The distinction never received widespread approval and, though 
vestigial references to the doctrine still occasionally appear in free 
exercise cases, 91 it has been thoroughly discredited by Sherbert and 
Yoder. It appears to be somewhat incongruous to make such a dis-
tinction when the first amendment speaks in terms of protecting the 
exercise of the religion, not simply the beliefs held under the religion. 
While it is true that "[t]he language of the First Amendment is to be 
read not as barren words found in a dictionary but as symbols of his-
toric experience illuminated by the presuppositions of those who em-
ployed them,"92 it must also be true that Congress meant something 
when it chose to refer to the free exercise of the religion, not simply to 
the freedom to believe in one's chosen religion. 93 However narrowly 
defined the term "religion" may be, it must encompass action in addition 
to belief. 94 
Carried to its logical conclusion, .the distinction would become 
ludicrous, as can be seen by a simple example. Inspired by a deter-
mination of the Food and Drug Administration that consumption of un-
leavened bread may result in stomach disorders, a state enacts a statute 
forbidding the manufacture or consumption of unleavened bread. A 
certain faith, however, requires its adherents, as a matter of dogma, 
to partake of limited quantities of unleavened bread on the annual oc-
casion of that faith's most sacred holy day. The statute, as applied in 
this context, would be held to violate the free exercise clause. Even 
though the statute may be a rational exercise of the state's police power, 
and would only be limiting religious conduct and not religious beliefs, 
89. See, e.g., United States v. Kissinger, 250 F.2d 940 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 356 
u.s. 958 (1958). 
90. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940). See also Davis v. 
Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). 
91. See, e.g., Biklen v. Board of Regents, 333 F. Supp. 902, 909 (1971), aff'd mem., 
406 U.S. 951 (1972); Kansas v. Garber, 197 Kan. 567, 574, 419 P.2d 896, 902 (1966), 
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 51 (1967). 
92. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 523 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., con· 
curring). 
93. See note 146 infra and accompanying text. 
94. Freeman, supra note 86, at 825. 
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it is difficult indeed to imagine a court sanctioning such a flagrant in-
fringement of religious freedom when a less sweeping prohibition could 
achieve the same statutory objective. 
Neutral Standards 
Immediately after the Sunday closing cases, Professor Kurland 
wrote of his concern for the relationship of the free exercise clause to 
the establishment clause. 95 Since that time, a number of commenta-
tors have written in response to Professor Kurland's analysis of that 
relationship. 96 Still Professor Kurland's discussion of the relationship 
remains the most cogent and significant. Professor Kurland argued 
that the two religious clauses in the first amendment are inseparable 
and must be treated as such by the courts, so that the state may not 
lawfully use religion or religious belief as a standard either for govern-
mental action or inaction.97 Neither burdens nor benefits may flow 
from the existence of a particular religion or religious belief; religion 
must be a neutral factor in formulating and applying regulatory 
schemes. 98 The state has as little right to promote the religious rights 
of individuals as it has to infringe them. Thus, when a court invali-
dates a statute, it may not do so on free exercise grounds unless it is 
also invalidated as to nonreligious individuals-otherwise the result 
would be a violation of the establishment clause. 99 
The argument no doubt has a certain straight-forward appeal and 
persuasiveness. As noted in a different context, however, "[t]he prob-
lem with the argument is that all the authorities are against him."100 
Those few courts .that have serioilsly considered the questions raised by 
Professor Kurland have uniformly rejected his contentions. For exam-
ple, in Commonwealth v. Arlan's Department Store of Louisville,101 the 
state had created an exception to its Sunday closing law for persons who 
observed a Sabbath day other than Sunday. The petitioner, a depart-
95. P. KURLAND, R.EumoN AND LA.w (1962). 
96. W. KATZ, R.EuGION AND .AMERICAN CoNSTITUTIONS (1964); Giannella, Re-
ligious Liberty Non-Establishment and Doctrinal Development: Part II, the Non-
Establishment Principal, 81 HARv. L. REV. 513 (1968); Stanmeyer, Free Exercise and 
tlze Wall: The Obsolescence of the Metaphor, 37 GEO. WASH. L REv. 223 (1968); Note, 
Tire Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses: Conflict or Coordination?, 48 MINN. 
L. REv. 929 (1964); Coinment, Religious Accommodation Under Sherbert v. Verner: 
Tire Common Sense of the Matter, 10 VILL. L. REv. 337 (1965). 
97. P. KURLAND, supra note 95, at 68. 
98. Id. at 18. 
99. Id. at 40-41. 
100. United States v. Wolf, 455 F.2d 984 (9th Cir. 1972). 
101. 357 S.W.2d 708 (Ky.), appeal dismissed for want of a substantial federal 
question, 371 U.S. 218 (1962). 
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ment store seeking to stay open on Sunday, argued that such an excep-
tion violated the state's neutrality requirement under the establishment 
clause. The court's response was succinct: "[T]he exemption does 
not affirmatively prefer any religion nor amount to the establishment 
of a religion. Rather, it simply avoids penalizing economically the per-
son who conscientiously observes a "Sabbath other than Sunday."102 
In essence, the answer in Arlan's is that which can be given gener-
ally to Professor Kurland: his broad conception of the establishment 
clause has never been accepted by the American judiciary, perhaps 
because to give it effect would be to largely emasculate the free exer-
cise clause.103 This problem is especially visible in the area of religious 
exemptions from statutes of otherwise general applicability, which the 
Kurland thesis would not allow on the theory that the exemption con-
stitutes a state-conferred benefit for the religious group involved. 
Where these exemptions are necessary to prevent the infringement of 
sincerely held religious beliefs, and where it is determined that a limited 
exemption would not defeat an overriding state interest of compelling 
character, the courts have focused on free exercise and granted relief-
despite the arguable "benefit'' to the religious claimants. The response 
to the establishment clause objections to these results is that such exemp-
tions merely tailor a statute, enacted without respect to the establish-
ment of religion, so as to accommodate the imperatives of free exercise. 
Any incidental benefit to a particular religious group thus is attribut-
able not to the statutory enactment or exemption, but to the free exer-
cise limitations upon the legislative power. Only where the classification 
of "religion" for purposes of triggering the exemption is so narrowly 
drawn as to exclude those who assert other than traditionally recognized 
religious convictions do establishment clause considerations tangentially 
arise. It was this problem that various members of the Supreme Court 
addressed in Welsh v. United States.104 
In Welsh, a case actually decided on statutory rather than free 
exercise grounds, a conscientious objector had refused to submit to 
military induction, but his refusal was not based on traditional reli-
gious grounds. Justice Black, for a plurality of the Court, held that 
section 6j of the Universal Military Training and Service Act10u could 
102. 357 S.W.2d at 710. But see State ex rei. Hughes v. Board of Educ., 174 S.E.2d 
711 (W.Va. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 944 (1971), where the State was required by 
the court to provide bus transportation for private s.chool children as well as for pub-
lic school children. 
103. See Iu:rz, supra note 96. 
104. 398 U.S. 333 (1970). See text accompanying notes 200-04 infra, 
105, 50 v.s.c. ~ 456(j) (1970). 
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properly be construed so as to include Welsh's moral and ethical beliefs 
so long as these beliefs were held with the strength of traditional reli-
gious convictions. Justice Harlan concurred in the result on the ground 
that a construction other than that put forth by Justice Black would be 
contrary to the establishment clause, as it would have benefited indi-
viduals solely because of their religious beliefs. 
Justice White-in a dissent joined by the Chief Justice and Jus-
tice Stewart-spoke directly to the establishment contention raised by 
Harlan. Relying on the argument of Justice Frankfurter in the Sunday 
closing cases, he stated that to deny an exemption to Welsh because his 
views were not religious would not result in a breach of the neutrality 
requirement under the establishment clause. Justice Frankfurter had 
argued that a state action would lose its presumption of neutrality 
"only if the absence of any substantial legislative purpose other than 
a religious one is made to appear."106 
The three Welsh dissenters found at least one such legislative pur-
pose-a practical judgment that religious objectors might be of no use 
in combat107-so that limiting the 6j exemptions to traditional religious 
views 
would be no more an establishment of religion than the exemption 
required for Sabbatarians in Sherbert v. Verner or the exemption 
from the flat tax on booksellers held required for an evangelist, Fol-
lett v. McCormick. Surely a statutory exemption for religionists re-
quired by the Free Exercise Clause is not an invalid establishment 
because it fails to include non-religious believers as well; nor would it 
be less an establishment if camouflaged by granting additional exemp-
tions for non-religious, but "moral" objections to war.1os 
Thus, two distinct approaches to the "neutrality" problem were 
advanced in the Welsh opinions. The first, embraced by Justice Har-
lan in his concurring opinion, averts collision with the establishment 
clause by adopting a sufficiently broad definition of "religion" for free 
exercise purposes as to negate any inference of favoritism.109 The 
106. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 468 (1961) (separate opinion). 
107. 398 U.S. at 369. 
108. 398 U.S. at 370-71. See also Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 454 
(1971), where Justice Marshall, speaking for an eight justice majority in denying an-
other establishment challenge to section 6j, stated that: 
"Neutrality" in matters of religion is not inconsistent with "benevolence" by 
way of exemptions from onerous duties . . . so long as an exemption is 
tailored broadly enough that it reflects valid secular purposes. . .. 
We conclude not only that the affirmative purposes underlying § 6(j) are 
neutral and secular, but also that valid neutral reasons exist for limiting the 
exemptions to objectors to all war and that the section therefore cannot be 
said to reflect the religious preference. 
109. 398 U.S. at 344-67 (concurring opinion). 
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second, embodied in Justic White's dissent, insists that "the First 
Amendment itself contains a religious classification"- . . . a classifi-
cation which need not be expanded to include nonreligious be-
lievers under the rubric of "neutrality."110 Either approach seems to 
bely the necessity of strict neutrality. In the subsequent case of Gil-
lette v. United States, 111 however, the Court clearly expressed its pref-
erence for Justice White's approach. By an eight to one vote, the 
Court denied that limiting the section 6j exemption to those opposed to 
all wars, as distinct from those merely opposed to "unjust'' wars, vio-
lated the establishment clause.112 
A final response to the Kurland theory is that exemptions limited 
to a particular religious group may be all that the free exercise clause 
can require in a particular situation. Free exercise, like free speech, 
is not an absolute, and thus its imperatives must be balanced against 
compelling state interests. Consequently, while an exemption limited 
to a small religious minority might not undermine a state policy ad-
vanced in a particular statute, the extension of the same exemption 
to a much broader array of claimants might well do so. Thus, in 
limiting an exemption to a particular religious group, the court or the 
legislature merely recognizes the limits of free exercise rather than ad-
vancing the particular religious cause. 
Despite the failure of the neutrality theory to gain a toehold in 
the courts, it is not inconceivable that the expanding scope of free 
exercise relief might resurrect concern with the potential establishment 
clause problems. Whether the doctrinal responses to the Kurland 
theory discussed above would withstand such a renewed attack re-
mains to be seen. If not, it is to be hoped that instances of apparent 
conflict between the two clauses will not result in automatic subordina-
tion of the libertarian objectives of free exercise to a scrupulous pre-
occupation with establishment problems. 
Direct/Indirect Burdens 
In Braunfeld, Chief Justice Warren discussed for the first time the 
importance of the distinction between indirect burdens on free exer-
cise rights and direct burdens. 113 A direct burden results when a reli-
gious practice itself is outlawed. A good example of a direct burden 
would be the criminal prosecution of a polygamist, 114 where it is 
110. Id. at 372 (dissenting opinion). 
111. 401 u.s. 437 (1971). 
112. See text accompanying notes 205-07 infra. 
113. 366 U.S. at 605-07; see text accompanying notes 23-38 supra. 
114. See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). 
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the actual practice of the religion which subjects the individual to crim-
inal sanctions. An indirect burden was involved in the Sunday closing 
cases.115 There, Orthodox Jews were not restricted from practicing 
aspects of their religion, so long as their businesses were not open on 
Sundays. Since indirect burdens could be viewed as operating less re-
strictively on free exercise, it could be argued that the state carried a 
lesser burden of justification in cases where they were involved. 
While it has been argued that this distinction is significant, 116 few 
cases were actually ever resolved in reliance on it. Indeed, the decisions 
in the Sunday closing cases themselves were not based on this dis-
tinction. The Chief Justice was careful to point out that even as to in-
direct burdens, the state would have to demonstrate that there was no 
alternative method of accomplishing its rational purpose which would 
not infringe on free exercise rights.117 
Almost two years to a day later the distinction was eliminated for 
all practical purposes by the Court in Sherbert.118 The burden119 in 
Sherbert was once again indirect, yet Justice Brennan, for the majority, 
stated that the state would not only have to demonstrate that there 
were no alternative ways of accomplishing its purpose, but it would 
also have to show that its purpose was so compelling as to justify interfer-
ence with the individual's religious rights.120 While Justice Brennan 
avoided expressly overruling Braunfeld, certainly the direct/indirect bur-
den distinction with regard to the nature of the showing required by the 
state was wholly rejected by the majority in Sherbert.121 
Balancing of Interests 
There are two kinds of balancing formulations which have been 
used by the courts in the free speech and, from time to time, in the 
free exercise areas. The first is the ad hoc balancing of interests, so 
115. See text a.ccompanying notes 23-54 supra. 
116. See, e.g., Note, A Braunfeld v. Brown Test for Indirect Burdens on the Free 
Exercise of Religion, 48 M1NN L. REv. 1165, 1166 (1964). 
117. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607. See text accompanying notes 23-38 
supra. 
118. See text accompanying notes 39-54 supra; see also Galanter, supra note 7, 
at 217. 
119. The burden in Sherbert was probably less severe than in Braunfeld, for Mrs. 
Sherbert would only have lost a few months of relatively low unemployment compensa-
tion benefits. Mr. Braunfeld, on the other hand, might have lost his entire business 
investment. 374 U.S. at 417-18 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
120. 374 U.S. at 406. 
121. Id. at 403-04. At least three justices in Sherbert believed Sherbert overruled 
Braunfeld, at least as to this distinction. See id. at 417-18 (Stewart, J., concurring); 
id. at 421 (Harlan & White, JJ., dissenting). 
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called because the court is asked to look to the particular facts in-
volved in the case before it and to weigh the interests of the state there-
in against the interests of the individual. It then determines if the 
state's infringement of the individual's rights is justified under such 
facts. 122 
In balancing interests under the free exercise clause in this fash-
ion, the individual has to make a threshold showing that the case does 
involve an infringement of bis religious rights;123 at that point the 
state is called upon to convince the court that its regulation is a ra-
tional one. Once both showings have been made, the court proceeds to 
balance the interest of the state in promulgating the regulation against 
the individual's interest in taking the restricted action and to deter-
mine which interest prevails. 
The chief benefit of the ad hoc balancing method is its flexibil-
ity, as it enables a judge to consider the circumstances of the particular 
matter being contested. In this way it is hoped that the courts will 
be able to avoid rigid, unrealistic approaches to adjudicating sensitive 
first amendment questions.124 
The major problem with the pure ad hoc balancing approach is 
that no matter what sort of guidelines the court utilizes to weigh the 
interests-and a number of incisive commentators have focused on the 
kinds of guidelines and interests that ought to be involved in the free 
exercise area125-the approach necessarily is based upon a considera-
tion of factors in only the specific case. Hence, it is the antithesis of 
that which Professor Wechsler would hope for: neutral principles that 
transcend the particular fact situation.126 That is, "ad hoc balancing 
by hypothesis means that there is no rule to be applied, but only in-
terests to be weighed. "127 The fact that there is no rule of law to be 
applied means that a citizen "has no standard by which he can measure 
whether his interests . . . will be held of greater or lesser weight than 
the competing interest . . . . "128 More important, perhaps, is that 
122. See, e.g., Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). 
123. For problems in defining religious rights for purposes of the free exercise 
clause, see notes 146-47 infra and accompanying text. 
124. See generally DuVal, Free Communication of Ideas and the Quest for Truth: 
Toward a Theological Approach to First Amendment Adjudication, 41 GEo. WAsH. 
L. REv. 161, 172-78 (1972). 
125. See Clark, supra note 88; Gianella, supra note 88. 
126. Wechsler, supra note 5. 
127. Nimmer, The Right to Speak from Times to Time: First Amendment Theory 
Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CALIF. L. REv. 935, 939 (1968). See 
also T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST .AMENDMENT 54 (1963). 
128. Nimmer, supra note 127, at 939. 
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when the courts balance the interests of an individual citizen against 
the interest of the state, "it is more than mere coincidence" that the 
state usually wins. 129 This is especially true in speech cases, for "in 
non-speech areas . . . public passions do not generally ride as high" 
as in speech areas;130 yet, no doubt courts have been, and will continue 
to be, loathe to turn away the states generally on claims of security, 
health and welfare. 
The second approach has been labeled the "definitional balance." 
As explained by Professor DuVal, 
[D]efinitional balancing seeks to formulate rules for differentiating be-
tween protected and unprotected expression. In formulating this dis-
tinction, the interests in freedom of expression must be weighed against 
competing governmental interests in much the same manner as under 
the ad hoc balancing test. The outcome of the process, however, 
is a rule which governs not only the case before the court, but future 
cases as well . . . . Moreover, the adoption of a rule will make it easier 
for the courts to resist popular pressures for suppression in particular 
cases.131 
Probably the most famous definitional balance took place in New York 
Times v. Sullivan.132 There, the Supreme Court determined that libel 
laws violated the first amendment when such laws were applied to ren-
der defendants liable for false statements concerning a public official 
and published without knowledge of falsehood or reckless disregard 
for the truth.133 
Professor Nimmer, in referring to New York Times, succinctly 
explains the difference between the two balancing approaches: 
[l]t should be made clear that there was balancing in Times, but 
that it was not ad hoc balancing. There was balancing in the sense that 
not all defamatory speech was held to be protected by the first amend-
ment. The Court could not determine which segment of defamatory 
speech lies outside the umbrella of the first amendment purely on logi-
cal grounds, and no pretence of logical inexorability was made. By 
in effect holding that knowingly and recklessly false speech was not 
"speech" within the meaning of the first amendment, the Court must 
have implicitly (since no explicit explanation was offered) referred to 
certain competing policy considerations. This is surely a kind of bal-
129. Id. at 939'-40. See also Clark, supra note 88, at 330; Dodge, The Free Exer-
cise of Religion: A Sociological Approach, 61 MICH. L. REv. 679 (1969). 
130. Nimmer, supra note 127, at 947. 
131. DuVal, supra note 124, at 179 (citations omitted). 
132. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See generally Nimmer, supra note 127. 
133. 376 U.S. at 279-80. 
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ancing, but it is just as surely not ad hoc balancing. 
If the Court had followed the ad hoc approach, it would have in-
quired whether "under the particular circumstances presented" the in-
terest of the defendants in publishing their particular advertisement 
outweighed the interest of the plaintiff in the proteetion of his reputa-
tion. This in turn would have led to such imponderable issues as: 
How important was it to the defendants (or possibly to the public at 
large) that this particular advertisement be published? How "serious" 
was the injury to the plaintiff's reputation caused by the advertise-
ment?l34 
Thus, for situations :in which the law of libel (or invasion of priv-
acy)135 comes into conflict with the first amendment, the Court was 
able to define a fixed threshold which must be met by any plaintiff 
who would overcome the assertion of first amendment rights-that is, 
a showing of knowing falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth. 
In this fashion, the need for case-by-case situational balancing was sub-
stantially reduced: if the plaintiff cannot make the threshold showing, 
the Court need go no farther. 
The Supreme Court in Sherbert and Yoder appears to have com-
bined the two approaches :in formulating a free exercise balance. The 
current free exercise test may be stated simply: if the individual dem-
onstrates that his actions are sincerely religious and have been :inter-
fered with as a result of a state regulation, the state must demonstrate 
that it has a compelling interest in the regulation, an interest which 
could not be promoted by any less restrictive means.136 If the state 
makes that demonstration, it prevails in the case; if not, it loses. 
The test consists of ad hoc balancing because :in each particular 
case a court must determine if a given state interest is substantial, if 
a person's rights are indeed religious, and if religious, whether they 
have been interfered with. It is not purely ad hoc in nature, however, 
for the Court has defined certain state :interests-such as problems of 
administration and weeding out fraudulent claims--as not substantial 
:in any case, and has further established that even an indirect burden 
may constitute an infringement of free exercise rights.137 
The test, having been formulated relatively recently, has not yet 
experienced any variety of severe problems :in reported opinions.138 It 
134. Nimmer, supra note 127, at 943. 
135. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967). 
136. See text accompanying notes 39-74 supra. 
137. See text accompanying notes 113-21 supra. 
138. But cf. Biclden v. Board of Educ., 333 F. Supp. 902, 909 (N.D. N.Y. 1971), 
affd mem., 406 U.S. 951 (1972), where the State's "compelling interest in assuring the 
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would not be difficult, however, to conjecture criticisms that will be 
raised. For example, one criticism of the test will surely be that judges 
and perhaps juries are asked to make an inquiry into a particular in-
dividual's religious sincerity. The chief critic of such inquiries was 
Justice Jackson. In United States v. Ballard/39 the defendant, a 
member of the "I am" movement, had been prosecuted for fraud. He 
was convicted of using the mails to solicit contributions, having repre-
sented himself to be a messenger of God. 
The Court held that it would be violative of the first amendment 
to inquire into the objective truth or falsity of the defendant's repre-
sentations, but it would be proper to examine ·the defendant's state of 
mind to determine if his representations were fraudulent.140 Justice 
Jackson took exception to the latter point. 
[A]s a matter of either practi.ee or philosophy, I do not see how we 
can separate an issue as to what is believed from considerations as to 
what is believable . . . . If we try religious sincerity severed from 
religious verity, we isolate the dispute from the very considerations 
which in common experience provide its most reliable answer.141 
While this Writer is unable to discern why a court could not look to 
whether a defendant is sincerely religious when it can, for example, 
determine if a defendant's activities are ideologically motivated rather 
than commercially motivated,142 some commentators have argued that 
Justice Jackson's position has at least limited validity. Professor Gian-
nella, for instance, has suggested that the "no inquiry" theory may 
serve to limit the government's power to restrict arbitrarily the activities 
of fringe religions on the grounds that such religions are "spurious."143 
fitness and dedication of its teachers" was held sufficient to outweigh the religious con-
victions of a Quaker teacher who refused to take a required loyalty oath on the basis of 
those convictions. More careful analysis of the competing considerations might have 
revealed an alternative method through which the State could have assured itself of 
the teacher's loyalty and dedication without requiring her to compromise her religious 
beliefs. 
139. 322 u.s. 78 (1944). 
140. Id. at 84-88. 
141. Id. at 92-93. Justice Jackson continued his analysis thusly: 
In the second place, any inquiry into intellectual honesty in religion 
raises profound psychological problems . . . . [Religious] experiences, like 
some tones and colors, have existence for one, but none at all for another. 
They cannot be verified to the minds of those whose field of consciousness 
does not include religious insight. When one comes to trial which turns on 
any aspect of religious belief or representation, unbelievers among his judges 
are likely not to understand and almost certain not to believe him. 
142. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942). The argument is particularly 
difficult to accept when it is noted that courts and administrative boards have tradi-
tionally (and presumably successfully) tested the sincerity of the religious belief in the 
Selective Service area. See text accompanying notes 197-209 infra. 
143. Justice Jackson's arguments are especially persuasive in cases where gov-
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Nonetheless, the Jackson position has never been adopted by the Sup-
reme Court or by many lower courts, and most judges routinely permit 
evidence to be presented concerning the sincerity of the individual in 
free exercise actions.144 
The second criticism of the evolving test concerns the necessity 
of determining whether particular actions or beliefs are religious for 
purposes of first amendment protection. Indeed, at least one court 
has stated, albeit in an indirect fashion, that it is beyond its power to 
say whether a belief or action is religious for purposes of the first amend-
ment: 
Defendants have not argued that the beliefs of Elijah Mohammed 
Muslims do not constitute a religion. A determination that they do 
not would be indistinguishable from a comparative evaluation of reli-
gions, and that process is beyond the power of a court.145 
This kind of reasoning is wholly indefensible, for determining what is 
the exercise of religion for purposes of the first amendment does not 
differ, in substance, from determining what is speech for purposes of the 
first amendment-a demanding, but wholly necessary operation. With-
out any definitional threshold enormous problems would arise in trying to 
maintain a viable, but not unlimited, free exercise clause. 
With regard to the practical problem of defining what is religious 
for the purposes of the first amendment, a number of commentators 
have tried, with varying degrees of success, to formulate definitions to 
assist the courts.146 For the purposes of this article, we shall employ 
ernment would otherwise act to protect gullible citizens from spurious re-
ligious movements; a monitoring of the sincerity of religious leaders should 
be placed beyond the powers of the government. Giannella, supra note 88, at 
1418. 
144. See, e.g., New v. United States, 245 F. 710 (9th Cir. 1917), cert. denied, 
246 U.S. 665 (1918); United States v. Kuch, 288 F. Supp. 439 (D.D.C. 1968); People 
v. Crawford, 69 Misc. 2d 500, 328 N.Y.S.2d 747 (Dist. Ct. 1972). But see Banks v. 
Board of Public Instruction, 314 F. Supp. 285, 295 (S.D. Fla. 1970), vacated to allow 
appeal to 5th Cir., 401 U.S. 988, ajf'd per curiam, 450 F.2d 1103 (1971). 
145. Cooper v. Pate, 382 F.2d 518, 521 (7th Cir. 1967). 
146. I submit that combining the sentiments and purposes which motivated the 
Founding Fathers, the numerous statements made by the judiciary, and the 
main thrust of contemporary thought, the following tentative definition can 
be given: Religion, for the purposes of the First Amendment, is a belief or 
system of beliefs founded on concepts of the supernatural usually expressed 
in terms of a personal god or gods, and inevitably concerned with the ends of 
man which purports to do more than relate each man to other men but also 
relates him to the universe or to the eternal. Supernatural does not necessarily 
mean that which is mysterious or irrational and incapable of human influence. 
Rather it encompasses all of that which is conceived to be beyond the natural 
order. Fernandez, The Free Exercise of Religion, 36 S. CAL. L. R.Bv. 546, 
561 (1963). 
See also Galanter, supra note 7, at 217; Hollingsworth, Constitutional Religious Pro-
tection: Antiquated Oddity or Vital Reality?, 34 OHio ST. L.J. 15 (1973); Weiss, Priv-
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a short but broad definition. The term religion will be defined here, 
as in the statutory selective service cases, as any "sincere and mean-
ingful belief, which occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel 
to that filled by [commonly accepted notions] ... of God .... "147 
Although this definition could be susceptible to overly-expansive 
application, such broad contours may be necessary to forestall the 
resurrection of establishment clause objections to particularized free 
exercise exemptions. Moreover, any dubious claim which passes the 
definitional test only because of its pliancy would be unlikely to possess 
the substance needed to offset a compelling state interest under the 
balancing test. 
The major inadequacy of the current balancing test, as applied by 
the Supreme Court, is its failure to encompass a necessary third step 
which would be essentially ad hoc in nature. The Court takes its first 
step in determining whether the individual's actions are sincere and 
religious, and whether they have been infringed by the state. It then 
takes the second step in deciding whether or not the state has a com-
pelling interest for its action, an interest which could not be promoted 
by any less restrictive action. At this point some "definitional balanc-
ing" may occur, in that certain state interests, such as administrative 
convenience, may be dismissed as short of "compelling" as a matter of 
law. If, however, the state interest is compelling, the Court stops and 
the state automatically wins, even if the individual's interest is excep-
tionally compelling. 
The third step proposed here would be to weigh, on an ad hoc 
basis, the importance of the state's interest against the importance of 
the individual's interest. Although this added step might render the 
ilege, Posture and Protection "Religion" in the Law, 73 YALE L.J. 593 (1964). The 
Supreme Court has also tried its hand at such definitional acrobatics: 
The term "religion" has reference to one's views of his relation to his 
Creator, and to the obligations they impose of reverence for his being and 
character, and of obedience to this will. It is often confounded with the 
cultus or form of worship of a particular sect, but is distinguishable from the 
latter. The first amendment to the Constitution, in declaring that Congress 
shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion, or forbidding the 
free exercise thereof, was intended to allow every one under the jurisdiction 
of the United States to entertain such notions respecting his relations to his 
Maker and the duties they impose as may be approved by his judgment and 
conscience, and to exhibit his sentiments in such form of worship as he may 
think proper, not injurious to the equal rights of others, and to prohibit legisla-
tion for the support of any religious tenets or the modes of worship of any 
sect. • • • It was never intended or supposed that the amendment could be 
invoked as a protection against legislation for the punishment of acts inimical 
to the peace, good order and morals of society. Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 
333, 342 (1890). 
147. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970); United States v. Seeger, 
380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965). For an extensive recent treatment of the problems involved 
in defining religion for free exercise purposes, see Hollingsworth, supra note 146. 
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free exercise standards less predictable in some cases, it is submitted 
that careful application of the "sincerity'' test to the religious claim 
and the "compelling interest" test to the state's justification will assure 
maximum desirable predictability in this area by deciding most cases 
before they reach this third step. Those cases pitting a sincere reli-
gious belief against a compelling state interest, the "close" cases, do 
not lend themselves to the relatively unyielding contours of definitional 
balancing. Considerations such as whether the individual's practice 
of his religion would be effectively destroyed and whether the state's 
interest occupies a priority in its hierarchy of values, among others, 
would be appropriate in such an added balance. 
While the necessity for such an added step cannot be shown from 
either Sherbert or Yoder-because in each case no compelling state in-
terest was found-the problem is certainly by no means purely academic. 
Indeed, in a large number of situations, such as the drug use148 and vac-
cination cases, 149 the problem is acute. 
For example, in People v. Woody, 150 the California Supreme 
Court recognized the problem in resolving an especially difficult free 
exercise issue. There, a group of Navaho Indians were arrested for 
possessing peyote. The Navahos proved that the state's restriction on 
the use of peyote severely limited their ability to exercise their religion. 
Though the court found that the state had a substantial interest in con-
trolling the use of drugs, even non-addictive drugs, the convictions 
were reversed on the ground that the Navahos' interest in practicing 
Peyotism outweighed the interest of the state in having them abstain 
from peyote. Under the Supreme Court's two-step approach in Sher-
bert and Yoder, the California court would never have reached this re-
sult in Woody, for as soon as the state demonstrated a compelling in-
terest, the case would have been over. If the state's interest is com-
pelling, the religious practice, regardless of its urgency, cannot prevail 
under the current test. 
Such a result would have been improper in Woody, for while 
the state's interest may have been substantial as a general matter, 
this was a situation where the defendants' religion was wholly elimi-
nated by a state regulation, a regulation which did not even arguably 
involve the restriction of unusually harmful drugs. Moreover, the de-
fendants' action did not result in any interference with the rights or in-
148. See text accompanying notes 151-66 infra. 
149. See text accompanying notes 178-81 infra. 
150. 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964). The case is dis-
cussed in greater detail in text accompanying notes 151-66 infra. 
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terests of others. Thus, on balance, the defendants' interest properly 
prevailed over the state's. 
APPLYING THE STANDARDS 
To recognize and recite the standards which have evolved in the 
free exercise area is hardly to appreciate the impact such standards 
have already had and will continue to have on the case law involving 
freedom of religion claims. It is only with the application of these 
standards to important fact situations that one can understand how far-
reaching the opinions in Yoder and Sherbert truly are. Our attention, 
therefore, turns to these fact situations with a view toward analyzing 
previous applications of the standards set by the Supreme Court and 
analyzing such standards in other contexts. 
Drug Use 
As early as almost fifty years ago free exercise claims began to 
be made in the context of statutes that prohibited the possession and 
use of drugs.151 Basically the free exercise argument against prosecu-
tions for possession of drugs may be stated thusly: the use of drugs 
is either an essential or important aspect of the practice of certain 
religions; hence, to prohibit the use of these drugs would be to infringe 
the free exercise rights of the followers of such religions. 
The Woody case, discussed briefly above/52 represents the only 
reported decision which has recognized the validity of this rationale. 
The California Supreme Court began its opinion with the recognition 
that peyote was a hallucinogen which could properly be proscribed by 
the state. The court further found, however, that in the Native Ameri-
can Church peyote served as both a sacramental symbol and as an ob-
ject of worship; its use for nonreligious purposes was deemed a sacri-
lege. Having so found, the court held that "[t]o forbid the use of 
peyote is to remove the theological heart of Peyotism."153 The statu-
tory prohibition against the possession and use of peyote thus "most 
seriously infringe[d] upon the observance of the religion."154 
151. State v. Big Sheep, 75 Mont. 219, 243 P. 1067 (1926). 
152. See text accompanying note 150 supra. 
153. 61 Cal. 2d at 722, 394 P.2d at 818, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 74. 
154. Id. at 720, 394 P.2d at 816, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 72. The California Supreme 
Court apparently recognized the breadth of its ruling, for on the same day it decided 
Woody it also decided In re Grady, 61 Cal. 2d 887, 394 P.2d 728, 39 Cal. Rptr, 912 
(1964). Grady was a ''peyote preacher" and ''way-shower'' who used peyote, he claimed, 
for religious purposes such as to effect direct contact with God. Even though Grady 
was not a member of any recognized religious group, the court sent the case back for 
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The state contended that-notwithstanding the defendants' free 
exercise rights-it had a compelling reason for prohibiting peyote in 
that Peyotism generally had quite adverse effects upon the entire Indian 
community. Moreover, the argument proceeded, if these Indians were 
granted exemptions from the statute, there would be grave difficulties 
in detecting a great many fraudulent claims of asserted religious uses 
of peyote as well as other drugs. The court rejected these arguments, 
finding first that, as a matter of fact, Peyotism did not pose any danger 
to the Indian community; indeed some experts "regard the moral stand-
ards of the Native American Church as higher than those of Indians 
out of the church."155 The court further held that the argument re-
garding fraudulent claims was simply not borne out by any evidence 
adduced by the state. The fact that some states, such as New Mexico 
and Montana, were able to allow for religious exemptions concerning 
the use of peyote for Indians without significantly impairing the effi-
cacy of their narcotics laws gave the court additional cause to attribute 
less weight to the purported state interests. 
The result in Woody appears sound, as does .the court's applica-
tion of the balancing standards. Nevertheless, while the defendant's 
interest in practicing his religion was paramount, it is difficult to see 
how the court was able to say that the state's interest was not suffici-
ently strong as to Woody. This difficulty was best pointed out by 
Judge Hufstedler in Kennedy v. Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous 
Drugs.156 Following the Woody decision, the Department of Justice 
listed exemptions in their rules concerning the definitions of dangerous 
drugs so as to adopt the holding in Woody. Each rule exempted from 
its application the use of peyote in bona fide religious ceremonies of 
the Native American Church. 157 The plaintiff in Kennedy was a mem-
ber of the Church of the Awakening who claimed that he, like the 
Navajos, used peyote in bona fide religious ceremonies. He contended 
that the adminstrative exemptions created after Woody set an arbitrary 
classification distinguishing between members of the Native American 
Church and members of the Church of the Awakening, considering 
that the two uses of the drug were virtually identical. The relief sought 
in Kennedy was an order directing the government to include the 
Church of the Awakening in the two exemptions. 
One very tough problem with this argument, one apparently not 
trial on the question of "whether the defendant actually engaged in good faith in the 
practice of the religion." 61 Cal. 2d at 888, 394 P.2d at 729, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 913. 
155. 61 Cal. 2d at 723, 394 P.2d at 818, 40 CaL Rptr. at 74. 
156. 459 F.2d 415 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1115 (1973). 
157. 21 C.P.R. § 320.3 (1971). 
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argued substantively in Woody, is that the legislature had initially made 
a determination that peyote was dangerous for individuals. If that leg-
islative determination is correct, and if it is a proper subject for legisla-
tive determination, the state's interest may well be a compelling one.158 
At that point it becomes rather difficult to see how the government 
can legitimately distinguish between Navajo Indians and all other per-
sons for purposes of enforcing its drug laws. The drug is just as dan-
gerous to the individual no matter what his religious views/59 so how 
can the defendanfs free exercise argument possibly prevail? 
The answer to this argument, with which the Woody and Kennedy 
courts did not specifically deal, is that the interest of the government 
in controlling the use of peyote simply may not be as great as the 
interest of the government in controlling the use of other more dangerous 
drugs. That is, the state's interest in curbing the use of highly addic-
tive drugs, such as morphine or heroin, may be greater than its interest 
in curbing the use of peyote or marijuana, because of both the difference 
in effect on the individual and tbe more likely -anti-social activities a 
morphine or heroin addict may engage in. That being the case, 
the government's interest in restricting the use of peyote, while perhaps 
strong generally, may still be outweighed by the interests of those per-
sons who worship the use of the drug or need to use it to effectively 
practice their religion. On the other hand, if the drug is heroin rather 
than peyote, the result would almost surely be different. 
This tension between the interests of the state and the individual 
effectively demonstrates the difficulty with leaving the balancing test 
as the Supreme Court formulated it in Sherbert. The state may be 
able to show that its interest in controlling the use of drugs, even non-
addictive drugs, is strong and that no viable way of promoting that 
interest exists except to prohibit its use by every person. Once such 
158. Whether or not the state has the authority to make legislative determinations 
concerning the use of drugs is a particularly tough question when the drug is an hallu-
cinogen rather than a narcotic. Without physically addictive drugs as the subject of 
the action, important issues exist (which have beeu raised by John Stuart Mill among 
others) concerning the appropriate functions of the state in involving itself in activi-
ties of the individual which are wholly private and are unlikely to manifest themselves 
in overtly anti-social conduct. See text accompanying notes 167-77 infra. 
159. As the Court in Kennedy posed the issue: 
We cannot say that the Government has a lesser or different interest in pro-
tecting the health of Indians than it has in protecting the health of non-
Indians. We cannot say that the Government's interest in a church member's 
health increases or dinlinishes depending upou whether his ingestiou of a 
dangerous dmg is of greater or lesser importance in the religious ceremonies 
of his church. It follows that the exemption regulation creates an arbitrary 
classification that cannot withstand substantive due process attack. 459 F.2d 
at417. 
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a showing is made, however, a court should not stop its inquiry. At 
that point the court should, as in Woody, weigh the allegedly compel-
ling state interest against what may also be a compelling individual 
interest. If the use of a particular drug is of substantial importance 
to the effective practice of the defendant's religion, and if the drug 
is not addictive, then perhaps the individual's interest will outweigh 
the state's. 
Notwithstanding the justifiable outcome in Woody, the court's 
analysis is imprecise with regard to this essential step. Nevertheless, 
it is difficult to be too critical of the California Supreme Court, for 
Woody is the only case that has actually weighed the free exercise in-
terest of the individual against the state's interest and upset a drug pos-
session conviction. Most courts refuse even to consider the free exer-
cise claim, in spite of Sherbert. As the Oklahoma Court of Criminal 
Appeals remarked in Lewellyn v. State, "[1]here is no possible justifica-
tion for the use of [drugs] in the name of religious freedom."100 
While other courts have been willing to consider the free exercise 
claim, at least superficially, they have held either that the defendant 
did not make a showing that he used the drug in good faith pursuant 
to a deeply held religious belief, 101 or that the defendant cannot claim 
an infringement of his free exercise rights because the use of the drug 
was not "indispensable to the pursuit of his faith.11102 The latter dis-
tinction is hardly persuasive. Once the defendant has sustained his 
burden of proving that he used the drug sincerely as a result of a deeply 
held religious belief, the burden should, at that point, shift to the state 
to show that its interest is compelling and outweighs the defendant's. 
No_ doubt the courts may properly question a defendant's honesty, sin-
cerity, and good faith;103 it would seem, however, that once a practice 
is deemed to be religious, questions regarding what is "essential" as 
opposed to "important'', what is "indispensable" as opposed to "desir-
160. 489 P.2d 511, 516 (Okla. 1971). See also Orlando Sports Stadium, Inc. v. 
State, 262 So. 2d 881 (Fla. 1972); State v. Big Sheep, 75 Mont. 219, 243 P. 1067 
(1926); State v. Bullard, 267 N.C. 599, 148 S.E.2d 565 (1966), cert. denied, 
386 u.s. 917 (1967). 
161. United States v. Kuch, 288 F. Supp. 439 (D.D.C. 1968); People v. Crawford, 
328 N.Y.S.2d 747, 69 Misc. 2d 500 (1972). 
162. People v. Collins, 273 Cal. App. 2d 486, 78 Cal. Rptr. 151, 152 (1969). 
See also United States v. Spears, 443 F.2d 895 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 
1020 (1972); United States v. Hudson, 431 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 
400 U.S. 1011 (1971); Leary v. United States, 383 F.2d 851 (5th Cir. 1967), rel•'d on 
other grounds, 395 U.S. 6 (1968); People v. Werber, 19 Cal. App. 3d 598, 97 Cal. 
Rptr. 150 (1971); People v. Wright, 275 Cal. App. 2d 738, 80 Cal. Rptr. 335 (1969); 
People v. MitcheU, 244 Cal. App. 2d 176, 52 Cal. Rptr. 884 (1966). 
163. See notes 140-44 supra and accompanying text. 
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able" in a religion, is better left to the theologians. Af3 recently stated 
by one federal district judge: "The protection the Constitution extends 
to the exercise of religion does not turn on the theological importance 
of the disputed activity. Rather constitutional protection is triggered 
by the fact that it is religious.m64 
In short, it would be far better for the courts to begin to properly 
consider and apply the mandate of Sherbert and actually balance the 
two allegedly compelling interests. Such a balance, of course, would 
only occur when the defendant demonstrates both that his use of the 
drug is pursuant to a sincere religious dictate and that such religious 
dictate involves more than mere peripheral significance as to him. In 
most cases, the defendant will not be able to sustain the burden. In-
deed, most defendants who have raised free exercise claims in this con-
text have done so only as a last resort, with little apparent hope of 
prevailing. An atypical but rather amusing example is found in United 
States v. Kuch.165 There the defendant claimed that she was a minis-
ter of the Neo-American Church and further stated that marijuana 
and LSD were true sacramental foods and that their use was essential to 
her religion. The District Court patiently listened to these arguments 
but ultimately rejected them, 166 thus demonstrating that the expanding 
scope of free exercise protection need not entail ridiculous results. 
The Right to Die 
An individual voluntarily enters a hospital for treatment. She is 
advised that the treatment she seeks can only be successful if she is 
given a blood transfusion; she is further advised that if such treatment 
were attempted without a blood transfusion, she would die. She in-
forms her doctor that due to her deeply held religious beliefs as a 
Jehovah's Witness, she cannot consent to the blood transfusion. At 
that point, can her doctor successfully petition a court to appoint a 
guardian for that individual who will order the blood transfusion to 
be given? This question has been a recurring and extremely difficult 
one for the courts, as it puts into clear conflict two widely divergent 
philosophical views of what a state's relationship to its citizens ought 
to be. 
164. Unitarian Church West v. McConnell, 337 F. Supp. 1252, 1257 (E.D. Wis. 
1972). ,. 
165. 288 F. Supp. 439 (D.D.C. 1968). 
166. The Court's discussion of defendant's religion provided additional insight into 
its rituals and theology: 
Reading the so-called "Catechism aud Handbook" of the Church containing 
the pronouncements of the chief boo hoo, one gains the inescapable impression 
1252 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 1973:1217 
The conflict does not arise unless the individual is fully capable 
of making a rational choice. If the individual is either mentally in-
competent167 or a minor, 168 the courts will, as a matter of course, ap-
point the requested guardian. Absent some such showing by the state, 
however, the philosophical question becomes crucial: may the state 
protect a citizen against herself even if the individual seeks to avoid 
such treatment on the ground that she is following her religion? 
Some courts which have attempted to expressly resolve this ques-
tion have held that no relief could be granted the state or the doctor 
because the issue was "beyond the reach of judges."160 These courts 
are careful to find that in such a situation-even though it involves life-
or-death decisions-the state does not have any interest which out-
weighs the individual's religious dictates unless particular extenuating 
circumstances are present. Such circumstances might include the fact 
that the individual has a large family and without his support the state 
would have to provide care for the family; this may well be conclusive 
if the family includes small children. 170 
Oher courts take the position that the state has an overriding 
that the membership is mocking established institutions, playing with words 
and totally irreverent in any sense of the term. Each member carries a 
"martyrdom record" to reflect his arrests. The church symbol is a three-eye 
toad. Its bulletin is the "Divine Toad Sweat." The church key is, of course, 
the bottle opener. The official songs are "Puff, the Magic Dragon" and 
"Row, Row, Row Your Boat." In short, the "Catechism and Handbook" is 
full of goofy nonsense, contradictions, and irreverent expressions. Id. at 
444-45. 
167. Application of the President and Director of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 
1000 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964); Winters v. Miller, 306 
F. Supp. 1158 (E.D. N.Y. 1969), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 985 (1971). 
168. Even John Stuart Mill, the champion of the primacy of individual decision 
over state paternalism, would agree that minors may not be asked to make these life 
and death decisions. 
It is, perhaps, hardly necessary to say that this doctrine [sovereignty of the 
individual over his own body and mind] is meant to apply only to human 
beings in the maturity of their facilities. We are not speaking of children, or 
of young persons below the age which the law may fix as that of manhood or 
womanhood. Those who are still in a state to require being taken care of by 
others, must be protected against their own actions as well as against external 
injury. J.S. MILL, ON LmERTY 10. (Crofts Classics ed.). 
Compare with In re Green, 448 Pa. 338, 292 A.2d (1972), (discussed in text accom-
panying note 71 supra) and In re Seiferth, 309 N.Y. 80, 127 N.E.2d 280 (1955) (no 
guardian appointed where both the father and 14 year old child had religious convic-
tions against surgical treatment of a cleft-palate because child's physical life not in 
peril). 
169. Application of President and Director of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 
1010, 1015 (D.C. Cir. 1964), on petition for rehearing en bane (Burger, J., dissenting). 
See also Holmes v. Silver Cross Hospital, 340 F. Supp. 125 (N.D. Ill. E.D. 1972); I11 re 
Brooks Estate, 32 ill. 2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965); Erickson v. Dilgard, 252 
N.Y.S.2d 705, 44 Misc. 2d 27 (1962). 
170. See, e.g., In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372 (D.C. Ct. of App. 1972) (dictum). 
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interest in protecting the lives of its citizens even if that protection is 
against the individual's wishes. These courts hold that the state's in-
terest justifies the infringement of the free exercise rights171 and will 
order the transfusion. In short, these courts agree with the dictum 
of Judge J. Skelly Wright, who directed that an emergency blood trans-
fusion be given to a Jehovah's Witness because "I determined to act 
on the side of life."172 
For the purposes of our analysis, this broad question does not en-
compass issues surrounding the sort of test that should be applied to 
determine if the state's interest outweighs the individual's. Rather, the 
question here is whether the interest claimed by the state is properly 
the subject of legislative or judicial consideration.173 If John Stuart 
Mill's theory of the individual's autonomy over his own fate was wrong, 
and the state may legitimately move to protect a citizen against him-
self/ 74 there can be little doubt that the state should and will prevail 
in the blood transfusion cases, no matter what test or balance is ap-
plied. Moreover, if the Mill view is not adopted, under any test, the 
state would also, for example, be able to order all motorcyclists to wear 
helmets while driving/75 and to prohibit the taking of poisons or the 
171. United States v. George, 239 F. Supp. 752 (D. Conn. 1965); Kennedy Mem-
orial Hospital v. Heston, 58 NJ. 576, 279 A.2d 670 (1971). For a harsh criticism of 
Heston, see 41 FoRD. L. REv. 158, 166 (1972). 
172. Application of the President and Director of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 
1000, 1010 (D.C. Cir. 1964). This statement was clearly dictum, however, because 
Judge Wright was careful to point out that it was clear that the woman needed a blood 
transfusion to survive and that "the woman was not in a mental condition to make a 
decision." ld. at 1007. 
173. For two excellent discussions of the kinds of interests that the State may con-
stitutionally base legislation on if free exercise questions are raised, and the weight that 
should be given to such interests, see Clark, supra note 88; Giannella, supra note 88. 
174. That the ouly purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over 
any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to 
others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. 
He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forebear because it will be better 
for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because, in the opinions 
of others to do so would be wise, or even right. These are good reasons for 
remonstrating with him, or reasoning with him, or persuading him, or en-
treating him, but not for compelling him, or visiting him with any evil in 
case he do otherwise. To justify that, the conduct from which it is desired to 
deter him, must be calculated to produce evil to some one else. The only part 
of the conduct of any one, for which he is amenable to society, is that 
which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his inde-
pendence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, 
the individual is sovereign. J.S. MILL, supra note 168, at 9-10. 
175. Bogue v. Faircloth, 316 F. Supp. 486 (S.D. Fla. 1970), appeal dismissed, 441 
F.2d 623 (5th Cir. 1971); State v. Eitel, 227 So. 2d 489 (Fla. 1969). In numerous 
cases such as these, judges avoid the Mill argument by pointing out that the wearing 
of helmets may eliminate accidents. But see People v. Fries, 42 Ill. 2d 446, 250 
N.E.2d 149 (1969), where an illinois statute required the wearing of both headgear and 
goggles while driving a motorcycle. The court held that while it would be lawful to 
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use of snakes during a religious ceremony.176 
The point is, if the state has the power to protect citizens against 
themselves, there are all kinds of imposing regulations which will be 
upheld by the courts, even if serious free exercise contentions are 
raised, unless less onerous ways of achieving that protection are avail-
ableP7 Whether the state has, or should have, such power has been 
debated without a satisfactory resolution by lawyers, politicians, and 
philosophers for centuries. Here the question is simply put into focus 
once again. 
This writer is of the view that no infringement of free exercise 
rights should be validated by the courts in this context unless either 
the exercise of those rights infringe on the rights of others or narrow 
en'tenuating circumstances exist. Such circumstances, as indicated above, 
include a showing that the particular individual had support obligations 
which would have to be borne by the state, or the fact that the 
individual was somehow not competent .to make a rational decision of 
this magnitude. The mere fact that the individual wishes to resolve a 
life-death decision in favor of death, however, should not automatically 
give rise to such a strong state interest as to be dispositive of the ques-
tion. 
Compulsory Vaccination 
No American court has ever held that a statute or regulation re-
quiring that individuals be vaccinated, usually to attend public schools, 
was invalidly applied because of the adverse effect it would have on cer-
tain individuals' free exercise of religion. This has been so even when in-
dividuals have made showings that there has been no smallpox in the 
regulated county for over fifty years,l78 or that the vaccination itself 
posed a danger to the health of the individual.179 
With regard to the first of these two situations, however, it is diffi-
require goggles-because if a driver's vision is obstructed an accident could result-it 
would be unlawful to require headgear because there was no proof that the use of 
headgear would prevent injury to anyone other than the driver. 
176. Lawson v. Conunonwealth, 291 Ky. 437, 164 S.W.2d 972 (Ct. App. 1942); 
State v. Massey, 229 N.C. 734, 51 S.E.2d 179, cert. denied, 336 U.S, 942 (1949); 
Kirk v. Conunonwealth, 186 Va. 839, 44 S.E.2d 409 (1947). 
177. See notes 46-47 supra and accompanying text. 
178. Wright v. DeWitt School District, 238 Ark. 906, 385 S.W.2d 644 (1965). 
See also Vonnegut v. Baun, 206 Ind. 172, 188 N.E. 677 (1934); Mosier v. Barren 
County Bd. of Health, 308 Ky. 829, 215 S.W.2d 967 (Ct. App. 1948), Compare with 
State v. Miday, 263 N.C. 747, 140 S.E.2d 325 (1965). 
179. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905), For the potential dangers to 
the public at large resulting from increased inoculation due to the existence of a 
large population of uninoculated persons, see Clark, supra note 88, n.lOl. 
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cult to see how these cases remain viable in light of Sherbert and Yo-
der. The state may take the position, which is probably easily proved; 
that it has a compelling interest in keeping all infectious diseases such 
as smallpox from becoming epidemics. The state could even validly 
argue that it has a compelling interest in precluding even the marginal 
probability of an epidemic. The difficulty with this argument, how-
ever, concerns whether compulsory vaccination is necessary to achieve 
that result. Presumably, if all but a small minority made up of de-
voutly religious individuals become vaccinated, there is no plausible 
danger of such a widespread epidemic, even though those few individ-
duals who refused to be vaccinated themselves might become infected 
with the disease. 
Without that danger to others, the central question becomes the 
same as is raised in those situations where persons refuse, on religious 
grounds, to have life-saving medical treatment: can a state protect an 
individual against himself?180 The problem, however, is somewhat 
easier in this context; for virtually every case where the difficulty has 
arisen involves parents refusing to let their children be vaccinated be-
fore attending public schools. Even those staunchest supporters of 
Mill would take the position that the children themselves cannot make 
a rational choice concerning a possibly life-or-death situation and there-
fore the state may properly step in as parens patriae to insure that no 
harm comes to the children. 
The focus of the courts in deciding such cases has, however, been 
imprecise, to say the least. To recite merely that a compelling state in-
terest exists in having persons vaccinated gives an insufficient considera-
tion to the religious interest; Sherbert and Yoder require more. Because 
these vaccination cases do involve children, though, the state will 
no doubt be able to make its compelling parens patriae interest 
prevail. Hence, a court's analysis may be nothing more than a 
purely academic exercise. While it is true that the parens patriae argu-
ment was basically the one made and rejected in Yoder, surely the 
vaccination cases are distinguishable from Yoder in that there is truly 
a clear "and ever present danger" of severe physical harm if a child 
is not inoculated against a disease such as smallpox.181 
Prisoner Claims 
Since Sherbert was decided, complaints have been filed in vir-
tually every jurisdiction by persons who are incarcerated alleging vio-
180. See text accompanying notes 167-77 supra. 
181. Wright v. DeWitt School District, 238 Ark. 906, 909, 385 S.W.2d 644, 646 
(1965). 
1256 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 1973:1217 
lations of free exercise rights. Most of these actions have been brought 
by members of the Black Muslim sect who contend that they, unlike 
other prisoners, are not allowed to hold religious meetings, cannot have 
their religious leaders attend to their needs, are not allowed to receive 
religious literature, and are prohibited from following their dietary 
laws.182 
Until very recently, such actions have been disposed of with very 
little serious consideration. While recognizing that a prisoner's first 
amendment rights do not wholly disappear when he is incarcerated, 
most courts have approved the prison's restrictions of such rights on the 
ground that prison regulations were best left to the discretion of the 
authorities. In these actions, most often the complaints were summarily 
dismissed without an evidentiary hearing, even though the pleadings 
seemingly raised non-frivolous free exercise claims.183 
Two concerns of the courts in this area may help to explain the 
singularly unsuccessful results of these prisoner actions in the past. 
The first is typified by United States ex rel Goings v. Aar_on184 where 
a Sioux Indian incarcerated in federal prison brought an action to 
prohibit prison officials from eliminating "good time" he had previously 
earned. A prison regulation stated that no prisoner could grow his 
hair over his collar, grow a beard, or grow sideburns below the ear 
lobe. When the petitioner grew his hair too long, he lost "good time" 
which had previously been credited even though he argued that his 
religion required that he keep his hair long. In upholding the prison 
officials' action, the court made it clear that it was concerned with the 
courts and prison officials being overwhelmed by masses of free exer-
cise claims: 
The consequences of a contrary decision than herein reached of course 
are that any prisoner who might claim a religious belief could claim 
exemption and the regulations might be rendered nugatory and pose 
an administrative disciplinary problem as to others. The court cannot 
believe that due process requires such a ruling.1S6 
The other concern of the courts centers on the nature of the doc-
182. See, e.g., Hoggro v. Pontesso, 456 F.2d 917 (lOth Cir. 1972); Barnett v. 
Rodgers, 410 F.2d 995 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Cooper v. Pate, 382 F.2d 518 (7th Cir. 
1967); Clark v. Wolff, 347 F. Supp. 887 (D. Neb. 1972); Theriault v. Carlson, 339 
F. Supp. 375 (N.D. Ga. 1972) (involving the Church of the New Song of Universal 
Life); Rowland v. Sigler, 327 F. Supp. 821 (D. Neb. 1971); Williford v. California, 
217 F. Supp. 245 (N.D. Cal. N.D. 1963). 
183. See, e.g., Cooper v. Pate, 324 F.2d 165 (7th Cir.), rev'd 378 U.S. 546 (1964); 
Childs v. Pegelow, 321 F.2d 487 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 932 (1964). 
184. 350 F. Supp. 1 (D. Minn. 1972). 
185. Id. at 6. 
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trines put forth by the religious groups involved in these actions, par-
ticularly the Black Muslims. Many judges take the position that pri-
son officials generally have a difficult enough time controlling and 
hopefully rehabilitating prisoners. They conclude that the government 
is justified in limiting free exercise rights for particularly obstreperous 
religious groups so that discipline, obedience, and control can be main-
tained.186 
There is unquestionably much validity in these concerns, particu-
larly the latter one, yet such summary decisions are difficult to justify 
in light of the Supreme Court's free exercise analysis in Sherbert.181 
The conclusion of the Court there was that courts cannot merely ac-
cept wholesale the state's rationale for actions which infringe free 
exercise rights; instead the courts must be satisfied that there is a com-
pelling interest behind the action, an interest which could not be pro-
moted by any less restrictive action.188 While prison officials must 
be allowed to exercise considerable discretion in deciding how to disci-
pline and control prisoners, the first amendment must nonetheless re-
main viable, within the limits necessitated by the exigencies of the pri-
son situation, even as to incarcerated individuals. 
The tension between these .two considerations is a delicate one, but 
one which must be faced openly and carefully in every situation. Thus, 
it has been recognized that where prison inmates file petitions alleging 
infringement of their free exercise rights, an evidentiary hearing on the 
merits of such allegations is constitutionally required.189 If the inmate 
can show at that proceeding that those rights have in fact been unduly 
restricted, then the burden shifts to 1:he state to demonstrate that the 
restricted religious activity presents a clear and present danger to the 
maintenance of prison security.190 Moreover, where such restrictive 
regulations fall more heavily upon adherents of a particular faith than 
186. See, e.g., In re Ferguson, 55 Cal. 2d 663, 674, 361 P.2d 417, 423, 12 Cal. 
Rptr. 753, 759 (1961) (the court stated that the "Muslim Religious Group is not en-
titled as of right to be allowed to practice their religious beliefs in prison ... "); 
Cooke v. Tramburg, 43 N.J. 514, 205 A.2d 889 (1964). 
187. See text accompanying notes 39-54 supra. 
188. Hoggro v. Pontesso, 456 F.~d 917 (lOth Cir. 1972); State v. Cubbage, 58 Del. 
430, 210 A.2d 555 (Sup. Ct. 1965). 
189. Hoggro v. Pontesso, 456 F.2d 917, 918 (lOth Cir. 1972); Brown v. Peyton, 
437 F.2d 1228, 1231-32 (4th Cir. 1971); Long v. Parker, 390 F.2d 816, 821 (3d Cir. 
1968). But cf. Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971), modifying 312 F. 
Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049, 405 U.S. 978 (1972); Ther-
iault v. Carlson, 339 F. Supp. 375, 387 (N.D. Ga. 1972). 
190. Hoggro v. Pontesso, 456 F.2d 917, 918 (lOth Cir. 1972); Theriault v. Carlson, 
399 F. Supp. 375 (N.D. Ga. 1972); Rowland v. Sigler, 327 F. Supp. 821, 824 (D. Neb. 
1971); Northern v. Nelson, 315 F. Supp. 687 (N.D. Cal. 1970). 
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they do on the general prison population, the courts will require a 
still stricter showing of necessity to justify their imposition.101 
That the trend today is to require such a stringent showing by the 
state can hardly be disputed. Typical of the more recent cases in 
this area which have adopted thoughtful approaches to the free exer-
cise issue is State v. Cubbage.102 There the petitoner was a Black 
Muslim prisoner who claimed that he was not allowed to receive ser-
vices and spiritual advice from clergymen, and that he and his fellow 
Black Muslims were forced to hold religious services in the prison yard. 
Prison officials responded by arguing that one of the clergymen invited 
to these services had a previous criminal record, and that "[t]he poten-
tial dangers inherent for many in the dissemination of their beliefs 
among the prison population warrant the restrictions imposed."103 
The court's disposition of the case reflects a sound understanding 
of the Supreme Court's mandate. 
It may be entirely possible that there are potential dangers in permitting 
[prisoners], in the case at bar, the right to practice their religious be-
liefs and to wear their religious insignia, but I do not believe that we 
should start with the assumption that trouble necessarily will result from 
[prisoners] being permitted to exercise their rights. If and when they 
do violate the discipline and applicable rules and regulations, they can 
be punished if the proven facts justify it. I know of no reason to deny 
the [prisoners] the equal protection of laws, even if it is feared that 
they might hereafter abuse the rights herein recognized.104 
If the state is able to sustain its burden of demonstrating that 
the petitioner in a particular action is unmanageable or constitutes a 
ditect threat to prison security as a result of attending religious meet-
ings and reading religious literature, at that point the state may legiti-
mately restrict such meetings and the receipt of such literature. Unless 
that burden is sustained and unless the state can also show that its in-
terest could not feasibly be "pursued by means that [less] broadly stifle 
fundamental personalliberties,"105 no valid reason exists for denying in-
191. Long v. Parker, 390 F.2d 816 (3d Cir. 1968); Cooper v. Pate, 382 F.2d 518 
(7th Cir. 1967). 
192. 58 Del. 430, 210 A.2d 555 (1965). 
193. Id. at 453, 210 A.2d at 568. 
194. Id. 
195. Barnett v. Rodgers, 410 F.2d 995, 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1969) quoting Shelton v. 
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960). See also Brown v. Peyton, 437 F.2d 1228 (4th 
Cir. 1971); Knuckles v. Prasse, 302 F. Supp. 1036 (E.D. Pa. 1969), aff'd, 435 F.2d 
1255 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 936 (1971); Brown v. McGinnis, 10 
N.Y.2d 531, 225 N.Y.S.2d 497, 180 N.E.2d 791 (1962). 
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dividuals their religious liberties, especially at a time when they may 
need them most.196 
Conscientious Objection Claims 
Under the Selective Service Act. While the Supreme Court has 
never expressly held that a conscientious objector has no right, under 
the free exercise clause, to be exempt from military service, the lower 
courts are virtually unanimous in so holding.197 The lower courts have 
also consistently held that the alternative service requirement for the 
religious conscientious objector is valid198 and that there is no burden 
of proof on the government to demonstrate that there is a less restric-
tive alternative available other than alternative service.199 
The only free exercise "in-road" that has occurred in the area of 
compulsory military service concerns the expanding definition of a 
conscientious objector eligible for exemption. Yet even here, the 
broadening scope of the exemption was based, at least ostensibly, on 
statutory construction rather than on constitutional compulsion. In 
Welsh v. United States,200 the defendant objected to war in any form, 
but the basis of his objection was not religious in the traditional sense, 
as seemingly required by section 6j of ·the Universal Military Training 
and Service Act201 Justice Black's plurality opinion, relying on 
United States v. Seeger,202 held that Welsh was entitled to his exemp-
196. See generally A. HALEY, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MALcoLM X (1965). 
197. This is the rule in every circuit that has considered the question. See United 
States v. Koehn, 457 F.2d 1332 (lOth Cir. 1972); United States v. Wolf, 455 F.2d 
984 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v. Murray, 452 F.2d 503 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. 
denied, 405 U.S. 935 (1972); Clay v. United States, 397 F.2d 901 (5th Cir. 1968), rev'd 
on other grounds, 403 U.S. 698 (1971); Imboden v. United States, 194 F.2d 508 (6th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 957 (1952); United States v. Kime, 188 F.2d 677 (7th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 823 (1951); Brooks v. United States, 147 F.2d 134 (2d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 878 (1945). 
198. O'Conner v. United States, 415 F.2d 1110 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 
U.S. 968 (1970); Wood v. United States, 373 F.2d 894 (5th Cir.), vacated on other 
grounds, 389 U.S. 20 (1967); United States v. Thome, 317 F. Supp. 389 (E.D. La. 
1970). 
199. United States v. Milligan, 457 F.2d 916 (8th Cir. 1972); United States v. 
Boardman, 419 F.2d 110 (1st Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 991 (1970). 
200. 398 U.S. 333 (1970). See text accompanying notes 104-12 supra. 
201. Section 6j exempts an individual if "by reason of religious training and belief 
•.. [he is] conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form." 50 U.S.C. 
§ 456(j) (1970). 
202. 380 U.S. 163 (1965). In Seeger, the Court suggested that "[a] sincere and 
meaningful belief which occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that 
filled by the God of those admittedly qualifying for the exemption comes within the 
statutory definition." Id. at 176. 
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tion because Congress intended to exempt those, like Welsh, whose 
beliefs were deeply held and were based on a moral or ethical principle 
which was the equivalent of the religious principles referred to in the 
Act, so long as they were not based "upon considerations of policy, 
pragmatism, or expediency."203 
Welsh is as close as the Court has come to facing squarely the 
major free exercise argument, yet each member of the Court, with the 
exception of Justice Harlan, was careful to rest his decision on purely 
statutory grounds.204 Eight members of the Court have, however, 
expressly rejected a closely related free exercise argument. In Gillette 
v. United States, 205 the defendant challenged that portion of section 
6j which exempts only those who are conscientiously opposed "to par-
ticipation in war in any form." The defendant argued that such a 
restriction violated both religious clauses of the first amendment be-
cause it favored pacifistic religions over other religions and because it 
infringed the exercise of religions, such as Catholicism, whose adherents 
will fight only in "just'' wars. 
The Court, in an 8 to 1 decision, rejected both arguments. As to 
the establishment contention, the Court basically echoed Justice White's 
views in Welsh: The purposes of the exemption are neutral and secu-
lar; "the section therefore cannot be said to reflect a religious pref-
erence."206 The Court, per Justice Marshall, gave just as little weight 
to the free exercise contention: 
The conscription laws, applied to such persons as to others are not de-
signed to interfere with any religious ritual or practice, and do not 
work a penalty against any theological position. The incidental bur-
dens felt by persons in petitioners' position are strictly justified by sub-
stantial governmental interests that relate directly to the very impacts 
questioned. And more broadly, of course, there is the Government's 
interest in procuring the manpower necessary for military purposes, 
pursuant to the constitutional grant of power to Congress to raise and 
support armies. 207 
While it may be unfortunate that the Court has chosen to extend 
the section 6j exemption on strained statutory interpretation rather than 
on free exercise grounds, the result in Welsh is clearly the right one and 
may well be more than would have been granted on free exercise 
203. 398 U.S. at 342-43. 
204. For a discussion of the various concurring and dissenting opinions in Welsh, see 
text accompanying note 104 supra. 
205. 401 u.s. 437 (1971). 
206. Id. at 454. 
207. Id. at 462, citing U.S. CoNST. art I,§ 8. 
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grounds. On the other hand, the result in Gillette, in light of Sherbert 
and Yoder, is troublesome indeed. 
If an individual can show that his religious beliefs prevent him 
from participating in a certain war, there can be little question that 
his free exercise rights are being infringed if he is forced to choose be-
tween participation and a jail sentence. The argument is even more 
compelling if there is an alternative civilian employment program 
available. 208 
It is hard to see how the Supreme Court so easily rejects this claim. 
Justice Marshall's reference to "incidental burdens" does not nearly 
end the inquiry. The free exercise infringement is more severe than 
the incidental burdens in Sherbert or Yoder, as this individual is 
asked to either participate in what he deems an unjust war or go to jail. 
While the Court should properly weigh the government's interest in pro-
curing manpower for military purposes, this is only the first step in the 
analysis, for there certainly are ways of procuring sufficient manpow-
er without putting an individual in this unconscionable situation. Why 
could not the government be required, under the free exercise clause, 
to permit individuals such as Gillette to be either wholly exempt from 
military service or at least exempt from combat duty? The Army 
would no doubt be able to function; yet in any case the burden should 
be on the government to show that such an alternative would not work. 
Under the analysis set forth in Sherbert, 209 it is startling that the 
Court in Gillette could treat the free exercise argument in such a cava-
lier fashion. One can only hope that the result is an aberration, attri-
butable to the Court's concern for the problems involved in raising an 
army. 
Naturalization Cases. In United States v. Macintosh,210 the Sup-
reme Court was faced with the question of whether Congress in the 
Naturalization Act meant that a conscientious objector could not be-
come a citizen. Section 4 of the Act then required that an applicant 
for citizenship take an oath to, inter alia, "defend the Constitution and 
208. There are many tasks, technologically or economically related to the 
prosecution of a war, to which a religious or conscientious objector might be 
constitutionally assigned. As Jnstice Cardozo wrote, ''Never in our history has 
the notion been accepted, nor even it is believed, advanced, that acts thus in-
directly related to service in the camp or field are so tied to the practice of 
religion as to be exempt, in law or in morals, from regulation by the state." 
Hamilton v. Regents of the University of California, 293 U.S. 245, 267 
(1934). 
United States v. Sisson, 297 F. Supp. 902, 910 (D. Mass. 1969), appeal dismissed for 
want of jurisdiction, 399 U.S. 267 (1970). 
209. See text accompanying notes 39-54 supra. 
210. 283 u.s. 605 (1931). 
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laws of the United States against all enemies . . . "211 
Macintosh was willing to take the oath required by the statute, 
but he admitted that he would bear arms only if he felt that the particu-
lar war was morally justified. A five-justice majority held that the Act 
required that a naturalization request be turned down if the individual 
would not swear that he would bear arms under all circumstances in 
defense of this country. Chief Justice Hughes, joined by Justices 
Holmes, Brandeis, and Stone, sharply disputed the majority's reading of 
the statute. Hughes argued that the Act did not mean that conscien-
tious objectors could not become citizens, for Congress had previously 
exempted conscientious objectors from compulsory military service. 212 
Macintosh was overruled fifteen years later in Girouard v. United 
States.213 The majority in Girouard followed Hughes' Macintosh dis-
sent, and based its holding on purely statutory grounds. 214 The free 
exercise argument was not expressly considered in Girouard, as it had 
not been in Macintosh, except that in Macintosh Justice Sutherland gra-
tuitously remarked that there was no free exercise right to be exempt 
as a conscientious objector from Selective Service requirements. 216 
While a first amendment scholar might have hoped that the Court 
would have carefully considered and approved the free exercise argu-
ments inherent in the naturalization cases, it is no doubt true that to 
reach the result in Girouard the Court did not have to stretch the 
language and intent of Congress nearly as much as was subsequently 
done in Welsh. Moreover, unlike the situation in Gillette, the Gi-
rouard Court's construction of the statute caused the same result as 
would have been reached under a proper free exercise analysis.216 
211. Act of June 29, 1906, ch. 3592, § 4, 34 Stat. 596. 
212. 283 U.S. at 627-35. 
213. 328 U.S. 61 (1946). Congress altered the Act in 1952, presumably to take 
into account the Court's holding in Girouard. Act of June 27, 1952, Pub. L. No. 82·414, 
§ 337, 66 Stat. 258, codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1448 (1970). 
214. 328 U.S. at 66·68. 
215. 283 U.S. at 623-24. 
216. The lower courts have, in the later naturalization cases, generally followed the 
Supreme Court's lead in the selective service cases. See, e.g., In re Weitzman, 426 F.2d 
439 (8th Cir. 1970), where it was held that the meaning of the phrase "religious 
training and belief," 8 U.S.C. § 1448(a), shall be essentially that which was adopted 
by the Supreme Court in Seeger and Welsh. See also the cases interpreting 8 U.S. C. 
§ 1427 (a) which requires that an individual may only be naturalized if he or she "is 
a person of good moral character, attached to the principle of the Constitution •••• " 
The more recent cases in this area have held that one could not be denied naturalization 
if, because of religious training, he or she refused to serve on a jury, vote, or engage in 
politics. See, e.g., In re Pisciattano, 308 F. Supp. 818 (D. Coun. 1970). Contra In re 
Petition for Naturalization of Matz, 296 F. Supp. 927, 932 (B.D. Cal. 1969) (the 
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R.O.T.C. Cases. In Hamilton v. Regents of the University of 
Califomia,217 the Court was faced with a University of California re-
quirement that all physically fit male students participate in the school's 
R.O.T.C. program. Hamilton refused to participate in the program be-
cause he stated that it was contrary to his religious beliefs. He fur-
ther argued that military training in the land grant colleges was not 
compulsory in time of peace. The Court rejected these arguments and 
upheld his suspension from the university. The majority's opinion is 
of little significance for it does not seriously consider the free exercise 
claims raised by Hamilton. Justice Cardozo's concurrence (joined in by 
Justices Brandeis and Stone), however, did consider them: 
The conscientious objector, if his liberties were to be thus extended, 
might refuse to contribute taxes in furtherance of a war, whether for 
attack or for defense, or in furtherance of any other end condemned 
by his conscience as irreligious or immoral. The right of private 
judgment has never yet been so exalted above the powers and the 
compulsion of the agencies of government. One who is a martyr to 
a principle-which may turn out in the end to be a delusion or an er-
ror-does not prove by his martyrdom that he has kept within the law. 2ts 
After Sherbert and Yoder, Justice Cardozo's opinion appears sus-
pect. 219 His striking fear that to allow an exemption for Hamilton 
would somehow result in citizens being able to refuse to contribute 
taxes in furtherance of a war is an unsupportable conclusion. The 
state has a very different interest in collecting taxes than it does in hav-
ing university students participate in the R.O.T.C. program. More-
over, other states had exempted conscientious objectors from the re-
quirement without crippling their programs, thus negating any claim 
state has a " 'paramount interest' in insuring selection of future citizens with political 
credos compatible with government 'of the people, by the people and for the people'"). 
217. 293 u.s. 245 (1934). 
218. ld. at 268. 
219. The Supreme Court in 1959 refused to reconsider its holding in Hamilton when 
the same basic fact situation arose once again. Hanauer v. Elkins, 217 Md. 213, 
141 A.2d 903 (1958), appeal dismissed, citing Hamilton, 358 U.S. 643 (1959). The 
holding has not, however, been extended. See, for example, Spence v. Bailey, 465 
F.2d 797 (6th Cir. 1972), where the Memphis public high schools required one year of 
either R.O.T.C. training or physical education. The student was a conscientious ob-
jector who was denied his high school diploma after he refused to participate in the 
R.O.T.C. program. His high school did not offer the alternative physical education pro-
gram. The court in ordering the student's reinstatement was careful to distinguish 
Hamilton on the ground that here the student's attendance was required by law. 
Moreover, the court pointed out that the State could obviously not have any compelling 
state interest in having this student participate in the R.O.T.C. program because by its 
own statute it had made the R.O.T.C. training program optional to physical education. 
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that an all-inclusive program was necessary to achieve the govern-
ment's purpose. 220 
The chief problem with Hamilton, as with other early free exer-
cise cases,221 is that the Court did not even begin to balance the in-
dividual's interest against the state's interest. Hamilton might have 
been able to show both that the University of California was the only 
public university in the state, and that he could not afford to attend 
a private school, so that to keep him out of that school might be to 
effectively bar him from receiving higher education. And what in-
terest could the state balance against his showing? Possibly, as in 
the tax collection cases, the state would argue that a free exercise exemp-
tion, or any exemption, would render the system inoperable. It is 
inconceivable that a comparable showing could be made in this area. 
Thus, the state interest in a compulsory R.O.T.C. program would seem 
clearly insufficient to preclude religious exemptions under the current 
balancing test. One can only hope that the Cardozo opinion is the ex-
ception, attributable to a nation and a Supreme CoUI't preoccupied with 
the approaching menace of Adolf Hitler. 
Mixed Speech-Religion Cases 
Beginning in the early 1940's a number of important cases were 
decided by the courts which involved issues arising under both the free 
speech and free exercise clauses. There are two basic kinds of cases 
which fall into this category. The first includes what may conven-
iently be referred to as the "student compulsion cases." In these cases 
the primary ground for decision was that the individual's "right to be-
lieve" was being interfered with by the state. The fact situations com-
monly involved the expulsion of public school students who would not 
participate in a compulsory flag salute, 222 would not stand while others 
participated in the flag salute, 223 would not leave the room while others 
participated in the flag salute,224 or refused to participate in particular 
classroom assignments.225 The refusal in each case was based on the 
student's religious beliefs. 
220. See Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 614-15 (Brennan, J., concurring and 
dissenting), discussed in text accompanying notes 23-38 supra. 
221. See note 231 infra and accompanying text. 
222. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), overruling 
Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940). 
223. Banks v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 314 F. Supp. 285 (S.D. Fla. 1970), vacated 
to allow appeal to the 5th Cir., 401 U.S. 988, aff'd, 450 F.2d 1103 (1971); Sheldon v. 
Fannin, 221 F. Supp. 766 (D. Ariz. 1963), appeal dismissed, 312 U.S. 228. 
224. See Frain v. Baron, 307 F. Supp. 27 (E.D.N.Y. 1969). 
225. See Hardwick v. Board of School Trustees, 54 Cal. App. 696, 205 P. 49 (1921). 
Vol. 1973:1217] FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE 1265 
The second kind of case involves persons who were arrested for en-
gaging in overt speech activities arising out of their religious beliefs. 
The convictions in these cases were ultimately reversed, because they 
involved unusually restrictive and overly broad state regulations, such 
as: requirements of flat license fees to distribute religious materials;226 
city ordinances forbidding the ringing of door bells to circulate written 
materials227 or granting city officials virtually absolute authority to 
determine whether individuals could engage in pure speech activities 
in particular areas;228 and ordinances which wholly outlawed speech 
activities in certain sections of a city.229 
While most of the cases in both areas could properly have been 
adjudicated under the free exercise clause because of the religious moti-
vation of the individuals involved, they were decided on free speech 
grounds, as the courts and commentators have fairly uniformly noted.230 
However, most of them nonetheless reached the result which l).ppears 
to be mandated by Sherbert and Yoder, with the first amendment 
claims prevailing over indiscriminate statutory restrictions. 
In one important case in this area, however, the state did prevail. 
In Prince v. Massachusetts,231 a woman was convicted under the state 
child labor statute for allowing her nine-year-old niece to sell written 
material on the public streets. Mrs. Prince and her niece Sarah were 
Jehovah's Witnesses and the materials they distributed were religious 
tracts. Mrs. Prince argued that both she and her niece believed de-
voutly in the distribution of the religious literature so that the state's 
interference with their actions was unconstitutional. 232 Over the vig-
orous dissent of Justice Murphy, the Court entirely rejected this con-
tention: 
There, a number of children were expelled from school for refusing to dance "the 'waltz' 
step, the 'polka' step, the 'two-step,' and a dance that is 'equal' or similar to the 'fox-
trot.' " I d. at 712, 205 P. at 55. 
226. See Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1942), overruling Jones v. Opel-
ika, 316 u.s. 584 (1941). 
227. Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943). 
228. Largent v. Texas, 318 U.S. 418 (1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 
(1940). 
229. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. City of New Orleans, 347 F. 
Supp. 945 (E.D. La. 1972). 
230. See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 86, at 806; Giannella, supra note 88, at 
1398; Kurland, supra note 95, at 51-54. Indeed, Professor Kurland would make 
quite sure that each of these cases was decided on free speech grounds so as to avoid 
any establishment problems. Id. at 60-64. See notes 96-99 supra and accompanying 
text. 
231. 321 u.s. 158 (1944). 
232. Id. at 167. 
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Parents may be free to become martyrs themselves. But it does not 
follow [that] they are free, in identical circumstances, to make martyrs of 
their children before they have reached the age of full and legal dis-
cretion when they can make that choice for themselves.238 
Prince today appears quite suspect. Indeed, even prior to Yoder 
a number of commentators had stated that the holding in Prince was 
erroneous. 234 The chief problem with Prince is the Court's failure to 
consider seriously the religious nature of the activity of Mrs. Prince 
and her niece. Thus, while the state has a legitimate interest in generally 
keeping young children from engaging in commercial activities it is 
difficult to see how this interest is served by prosecuting Mrs. Prince, 
who was concededly a devoutly religious individual. The situation in 
Prince is strikingly analagous to Yoder, but unlike Yoder, the Court 
in Prince did not examine the state's interest carefully to determine if 
this particular application of the regulation would promote that in-
terest. 
Young Sarah was distributing religious literature with her aunt 
because both she and her aunt believed that such distribution was an 
essential aspect of their religion. The usual evils of allowing children 
to work-improper environment, strenuous labor, and so on-were 
probably not present in Prince. Had the Court, as in Yoder, carefully 
examined the effect which an exemption would actually have on the 
child, the rationale of the state interest may have largely been negated. 
As with Wisconsin in Yoder, it can be said that Massachusetts had an 
otherwise valid statute whose purposes were either not carried out by 
the prosecution of the defendant or were outweighed by the .defendant's 
interest in practicing her religion. As with Mr. Yoder, Mrs. Prince's 
conviction should have been reversed under the free exercise clause. 
Abortions and Military Service 
A female officer in the armed forces becomes pregnant. Pur-
suant to a service regulation235 she is discharged. The woman is Cath-
olic and her religion firmly prohibits her from getting an abortion, so 
she seeks reinstate~ent in her position, claiming that her free exercise 
rights have been violated. She argues that she is being discriminated 
against because her discharge results from her refusal to take action 
233. ld. at 170. 
234. Giannella, .supra note 88, at 1395; Comment, 10 VILL. L. REv. 337, 345-46 
(1965). 
235. The commission of any woman officer will be terminated with the least 
practical delay when it is determined that one of the conditions in a. or b, 
below exists • • • • 
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prohibited by her religion, while other pregnant females are not dis-
charged because they can and do have abortions. 
The officer's argument is not without merit. While the govern-
ment certainly has a compelling interest in not having a pregnant 
woman in a combat zone-to argue the strongest case for the govern-
ment-it would not appear to be too much to require the government 
either to transfer the officer to a non-combat zone during the later 
months of her pregnancy, or to give her a leave of absence for anum-
ber of months. If the government can show that such adjustments 
substantially disrupt the efficiency of the military units concerned, then 
the state interest in an efficient military should prevail. But the two 
courts which have considered this question in the context of free 
exercise claims made little236 or no237 attempt to analyze that interest 
or to balance it against the gravity of the particular free exercise 
claim. 
Clearly there are a number of effective alternatives which could 
accomplish the government's goals without infringing on the free exer-
cise rights of military personnel. In Robinson v. Rand,238 a recent 
case involving the pregnancy discharge of an Air Force NCO who was 
not in proximity to a combat situation, a federal district court struck 
down the pregnancy regulation as applied, albeit on due process rather 
than free exercise grounds. The court carefully distinguished the 
considerations of personnel utilization and finance, which were held 
the sole justifications for applying the regulation to Airman Robinson, 
from the more compelling exigencies of the combat situation. The 
court further suggested that,, had the petitioner been in a combat 
zone, a transfer "must be used as an alternative to discharge" if it is 
practically possible. 239 
The searching scrutiny of the government's interest in the preg-
a. Pregnancy: 
(1) General: 
(a) A woman will be discharged from the service with the 
least practical delay when a determination is made by a medical 
officer that she is pregnant • • • • 
b. Minor Children: 
(1) General: 
The commission of any woman officer will be terminated 
with the least practical delay when it is established that she: 
(ci) ·Has given birth to a living child while in a com-
missioned officer status. Air Force Regulation 36-12, 40. 
236. Struck v. Secretary of Defense, 460 F.2d 1372 (9th Cir.), vacated and rem'd 
409 u.s. 1071 (1972). 
237. Guiterrez v. Laird, 346 F. Supp. 289 (D.D.C. 1972). 
238. 340 F. Supp. 37 (D. Colo. 1972). 
239. Id. at 41. 
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nancy regulation applied by the court in Robinson is likewise required 
when the challenge is grounded on free exercise. Thus, if a non-infring-
ing alternative to a pregnancy discharge is practically available, judicial 
ratification of the regulation is unwarranted. 240 
Employment Relations Matters 
A number of important free exercise issues have arisen in the em-
ployment context. Perhaps the most dramatic situation involves the 
question of whether an employee can be required to associate with a 
union once his employer enters into a union shop agreement, even if 
such an association is contrary to that individual's religious views. A 
striking example of this situation is found in Linscott v. Millers Fall 
Company.241 There the plaintiff, a devout Seventh Day Adventist, 
had been employed by the defendant for over eighteen years. At the 
end of this period the defendant entered into a collective bargaining 
agreement with a union providing for a union shop arrangement. When 
the plaintiff refused to pay dues to the union as required under that 
agreement, he was fired. Plaintiff raised as his sole argument the claim 
that his firing violated his free exercise rights in that his refusal to pay 
dues to the union was solely due to his religious beliefs. 
The First Circuit rejected this argument, finding that the union 
did not require the plaintiff to become affiliated with it, only that he 
pay dues; and that, in any case, there was a strong governmental in-
terest in preserving the union shop arrangement which would out-
weigh the plaintiffs religious interests. 
The result in Linscott may well be correct, 242 yet the court's rather 
cavalier treatment of the free exercise claim is disturbing. Perhaps the 
interests of the state do outweigh the individual's interest in these situa-
tions, and that even applying a strict test, the state would still prevail. 
Nevertheless, it cannot be discounted that the individual's interest is 
quite strong. He is not simply required to tolerate working in a union 
shop; rather he is required to associate himself affirmatively with the 
union by paying dues to it. 243 Under Sherbert the state should not, 
240. Cf. Note, Pregnancy Discharges in the Military: The Air Foree Experience, 
86 HARv. L. REv. 568 (1973). Compare Robinson v. Rand, 340 F. Supp. 37, 40-41 
(D. Colo. 1972) with Sherbert v. Vemer, 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1962). 
241. 440 F.2d 14 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 872 (1971 ). 
242. Linscott adopted the rationale offered by the Fifth Circuit in Grey v. Gulf, 
Mobile & Ohio R.R., 429 F.2d 1064 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1001 
(1971), and was followed by the Sixth Circuit in Hammond v. United Papermakers and 
Paperworkers, 462 F.2d 174 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1028 (1972). There 
have apparently been no reported cases reaching contrary results. 
243. This fact distinguishes the case from CAP Santa Vue, Inc. v. NLRB, 424 F.2d 
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therefore, automatically prevail. 244 
Yet, what is the substantial state interest in these cases that 
prompts the courts to reject the individual's claim? While there cer-
tainly is a strong state interest in promoting labor harmony, particularly 
in key industries, would an exemption to the union shop arrangement 
for a devout Seventh Day Adventist really threaten that interest? While 
others might seek to fraudulently avoid paying their dues, the disposi-
tive force of such an argument was expressly rejected by the Court in 
Sherbert. 245 The real issue is whether granting the exemption would 
as a practical matter result in labor strife. Would unions go out on 
strike because exemptions have been made for a relatively small group 
of religious individuals? If the court, upon reviewing the state's evi-
dence in this regard, finds that a strike is a real possibility then per-
haps the free exercise claim should be rejected. Absent some such 
strong showing, however, it is difficult to see why the courts so readily 
deny the individual's claim. 
The failure of the courts to analyze adequately this kind of 
argument is also demonstrated by those cases involving the question 
of how accommodating the state, as employer, should be vis-a-vis the 
religious dictates of its employees. In Dawson v. Mizell, 246 the plaintiff 
was a Seventh Day Adventist who had been an employee of the United 
States Post Office. His assigument shifted and he was required to work 
883 (D.C. Cir. 1970), where the NLRB ordered the employer to bargain collectively 
with the union in good faith. The defense of the employer was that he could not, 
consistent with his religious scruples, bargain with the union "in good faith." The 
court upheld the NLRB, stating that the employer need not believe in the National La-
bor Relations Act, only that he comply with its legal requirements. Thus, the mandate 
of the NLRB went to controlling the employer's conduct, not his belief. The point was 
crucial when the plaintiff conceded that the bargaining as such was not violative of 
his religious views, only the requirement that his bargaining be in good faith. 
244. While the Supreme Court declined to review Linscott, at least two members of 
the current Court have given some indication of how they might come out on this 
question. In Russell v. Catherwood, 33 A.D.2d 592, 304 N.Y.S.2d 415 (1969), cert. 
denied, 399 U.S. 936 (1970), the plaintiff was fired when he refused to join the union 
pursuant to the union shop provision of the collective bargaining agreement. The 
state court found that the plaintiff could not collect unemployment compensation be-
cause he had no "good cause" for refusing the job. Though plaintiff's refusal to join 
the union had nothing to do with free speech or free exer.cise claims-he refused because 
he had previously belonged to the union and had gotten into a dispute concerning pay-
ment of certain disability benefits-Chief Justice Burger and Justice Douglas dissented 
from the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari, remarking that the Court ought to con-
sider whether the first amendment "requires the [state] to provide employment that 
does not conflict with the worker's freedom of association, as might be indicated under 
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)." 399 U.S. at 936. 
245. See text accompanying notes 39-54 supra. 
246. 325 F. Supp. 511 (B.D. Va. 1971). 
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on Saturdays. He informed his supervisor that he could not work on 
Saturdays as he was a Sabbatarian; when he failed to show for his Sat-
urday assignments he was fired for excessive absence. He brought an 
action against the Post Office claiming that its termination denied him 
his free exercise rights. The court noted that there was a union agree-
ment in effect in the postal system covering 700,000 employees and 
that the union, stressing its need for a viable seniority system, stren-
uously opposed granting any special treatment to the plaintiff. Find-
ing that the interest of the state in making sure that the postal workers 
did not go out on strike was compelling, the court held for the Post Of-
fice. 
The court in Dawson properly analyzed the state's interest. In 
light of Sherbert and Yoder, however, the ultimate balancing ques-
tion was reached too soon. Once the plaintiff demonstrated that his 
freedom of religion was adversely affected by the Post Office's action, 
the court should have then determined whether there was any alterna-
tive way of promoting the state's interest which would have had less im-
pact on the individual. Certainly it is at least arguable that such an 
alternative existed. If the Post Office was concerned with the seniority 
system, it could well be that the plaintiff would have been willing to 
accept a drop in his employment status in order to be assigned to non-
Saturday jobs. Moreover, it is not at all clear that labor strife would 
have resulted had plaintiff been granted such an exemption. 
The Dawson opinion, however, is hardly unique in its holding 
that the state as employer need not go too far out of its way to accomo-
date its employees' religious beliefs. In Stimple v. State Personnel 
Board,241 for example, the plaintiff state employee was assigned to 
a job which required him to work on Saturdays. Being a Seventh 
Day Adventist, he did not show for the Saturday assignments. He 
was then fired, and the court refused to reinstate him. The state never 
made a showing that the plaintiff could not have been shifted to a posi-
tion which did not require Saturday work or that in fact union discord 
was likely to result from giving the plaintiff special treatment. Indeed, 
consideration of such factors would have been inconsistent with the 
court's manner of disposing of the action. 
The proliferation of religions with an infinite variety of tenets would, 
if the state is required as an employer to accomodate each employee's 
particular scruples, place an intolerable burden upon the state. We 
conclude that if a person has religious scruples which conflict with the 
247. 6 Cal. App. 3d 206, 85 Cal. Rptr. 797 (2d Dist. 1970), cert. denied, 400 
u.s. 952 (1970). 
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requirements of a particular job with the state, he should not accept 
employment or, having accepted, he should not be heard to complain 
if he is discharged for failing to fulfill his duties. 248 
The court's concern with the "proliferation of religions with an 
infinite variety of tenets" is understandable, yet its emphasis on this 
point is somewhat regrettable. The state may be able to show either 
that there would be labor strife or that-if this particular state em-
ployee was exempted-there would be chaos for its entire employment 
system. Absent some such showing in each particular case, however, 
such a position smacks of the fraudulent claims argument which was 
made to no avail in Sherbert.249 
CoNcLusioN 
The Supreme Court within the last ten years has expanded the 
scope and application of the previously dormant free exercise clause, 
as well as the scope of inquiry into the state interests set up in opposi-
tion to free exercise claims. It has been .the goal of this Article to focus 
on the Supreme Court's formulation of standards for adjudicating free 
exercise questions, and to apply these standards to a wide assortment of 
important free exercise fact situations. It is hoped that the courts will 
continue to take a long look at the broad arguments raised by the state 
and federal governments in this area, for it is only in the context 
of such vigilant concern for free exercise rights that the statement of 
John Stuart Mill will become reality for religious minorities: 
[T]he worth of a State, in the long run is the worth of the individuals 
composing it; and a State which postpones the interest of their mental 
expansion and elevation, to a little more of administrative skill, or that 
semblance of it which practice gives, in the details of business; a State 
which dwarfs its men, in order that they may be more docile instru-
248. 6 Cal. App. 3d at 209-10, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 799. The Stimpel holding is 
difficult indeed to accept, especially since the Supreme Court has consistently held 
that, in the free speech area, waiver of constitutional rights may not be imposed as a 
condition to public employment. See, e.g., Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 
563 (1968). 
249. See text accompanying notes 43-45 supra. But cf. Dewey v. Reynolds Metal 
Co., 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), affd by an equally divided court, 402 U.S. 689 
(1971). Congress in 1972 amended Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act to accom-
modate recent court decisions, and probably to overrule Dewey: 
The term "religion" includes all aspects of religious observance and practice, 
as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to rea-
sonably accommodate to an employee's or prospective employee's religious 
observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the em-
ployer's business. 
86 Stat. 103, amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.-2000e-15. 
1272 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 1973:1217 
ments in its hands even for beneficial purposes-will find that with 
small men no great thing can really be accomplished; and that the per-
fection of machinery to which it has sacrificed everything, will in the 
end avail it nothing, for want of the vital power which, in order that 
the machine might work more smoothly, it has preferred to banish.200 
250. Mn..L, supra note 168, at 117-18. 
